North Dakota Law Review
Volume 64

Number 1

Article 2

1988

Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of
Federal Indian Law
Jill Norgren

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Norgren, Jill (1988) "Protection of What Rights They Have: Original Principles of Federal Indian Law," North
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol64/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

PROTECTION OF WHAT RIGHTS THEY HAVE:
ORIGINAL PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
JILL NORGREN*

I. INTRODUCTION ............................ 74
II. LAW AND THE EARLY EUROPEANS IN THE
NEW W ORLD ..............................
75
A . THE SPANISH ............................ 76
B. THE DUTCH AND THE BRITISH ................ 78
III. REVOLUTIONARY AND TRANSITION YEARS..
79
IV. ENTER THE COURT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DOCTRINE IN FLETCHER, WILSON, AND
JO H N SO N .................................
83
A. THE YAZOO CASE: FLETCHER V. PECK ........... 83
B. NEWJERSEYV. W ILSON .................... 87
C.

JOHNSON V. M'INTOSH: POSSESSORY INTEREST BUT
NOT PROPERTY INTEREST ................... 88

V. A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: THE CHEROKEE
C A SE S ....................................
94
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .................. 94
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE.DOCTRINE OF GUARDIANSHIP FOR "DOMESTIC DEPENDENT NATIONS". . ... 101
C. THE SECOND "CHEROKEE CASE" .............. 105
VI. THE
EARLY
TEST:
MID-NINETEENTH
CENTURY
APPLICATION
OF ORIGINAL
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW ....... 111
A. EARLY AFFIRMATION OF INDIAN TITLE .......... 112
B. EXPANDING THE-SCOPE OF FEDERAL POWER
O VER TRIBES ........................... 113
C.
POST-ROGERS LIQUOR CASES ................... 115
D. TAXATION, TREATIES, AND LAND TITLE. ........ 116
VII. CONCLUSION ............................. 118
*Professor of Government, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University
of New
York. B.A. 1965, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. 1974, University of Michigan. I wish to thank

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:73

I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the nineteenth century, federal courts began to
adjudicate cases that required dealing, first, with the nature of
Native American land title, and later, with tribal autonomy and
sovereignty. Led by Chief Justice John Marshall, the "mid-wife"
of federal Indian law, 1 the United States Supreme Court developed
the legal framework that underlies tribal property rights and
political sovereignty within the United States. These original
principles of federal Indian law were established in a series of
3
2
Supreme Court decisions ending with Worcester v. Georgia in 1832.
Although it drew upon European and colonial precedent and
authority, the Marshall Court created its own unique vision of
United States-Native American relations.
These original principles govern federal Indian law to this
day. However, by narrowing and misapplying these principles, or
making selective use of precedent, subsequent federal courts have
justified federal Indian policies that often were not consonant with
4
premises and tenets.
the original
. This Article first describes the international law
and colonial
history that influenced the Marshall Court in the half-dozen early
cases critical to the development of federal Indian law. Next, the
doctrines in these early cases are described and compared with one

Jean Zorn of the City University Law School for her helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier
draft of this Article. I also wish to thank Petra T. Shattuck with whom I collaborated for many years
before her recent death, for her support and for her specific comments on this Article. I would also
like to acknowledge the grant support of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Research Foundation of
the City University of New York.
1. G. Lester, The Territorial Rights of the Inuit of the Canadian Northwest: A Legal Argument
175 (1981) (unpublished dissertation: York University).
2. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). For a discussion of Worcester, see infra notes 176-222 and
accompanying text.
3. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831);Johnson V. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Fletcher v.Peck,'10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810). Perhaps becauseJohn Marshall authored all four opinions for the Court, many
authors present the sequence of cases as a self-contained unit of early federal Indian law. See, e.g.,
Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500-02 (1969).
Marshall, however, also penned the decision in a case touching upon tribal sovereignty, New Jersey v.
Wilson, which is discussed less often. See NewJersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812). The
Court had also accepted the appeal of Corn Tassel, a Cherokee accused of murder, in 1830, but
Georgia defied federal judicial power and executed him before the Court could rule on the case. This
appeal was intended by the Cherokee Nation and its lawyers to be the original test of sovereignty but
that test had to wait until Cherokee Nation v. Georgia subsequently was filed. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). For a discussion of Cherokee Nation, see infra notes 139-74 and
accompanying text. The frequent use of Worcester as a capstone case has been encouraged by its fine
tuning of earlier points of law concerning tribal sovereignty and property rights.
4. See generally Newton, FederalPower Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 195 (1984) (analyzing subsequent supreme court opinions which undercut the view of federal
power and Indian sovereignty developed in Johnson and Worcester).
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another. Finally, judicial application of these original principles in
the decades immediately following the Marshall Court is analyzed.
In the period from the mid-t830s to the mid-1970s there was
continuous litigation by, and against, Native American
governments. A foundation of case law developed from the
Supreme Court decisions of this era characterized by judicial
schizophrenia. These decisions, by failing to be consistent, and
slowly eroding the intent of the original principles, facilitated
dramatic reworking of fundamental principles later in the
nineteenth century when the United States pursued policies meant
to assimilate Native Americans and terminate tribal government.
II. LAW AND THE EARLY EUROPEANS IN THE NEW
WORLD
The autonomy and sovereignty asserted by contemporary
Native American governments rests upon historical facts, legal
agreements, and ongoing political relations. The presence of
Native Americans on the North American continent prior to the
arrival of whites is basic to claims of sovereignty. The order of
arrival stands as virtually the only undisputed fact of Indian-White
relations. By the twentieth century, however, the order of arrival
had become a curious piece of information - obvious but commonly dismissed. Nevertheless, as the basis of tribal sovereignty
and aboriginal land title, it is the key to subsequent political events
and legal principles.
The Europeans who colonized North America in the
sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries came for a variety
5
of purposes ranging from gold and trade to permanent settlement.
They brought a European ethnocentrism, a desire for wealth, and
dealt with aboriginal occupation of North American land in
different ways. 6 Eventually, the European nations settled upon
treating Native American nations as autonomous, although alien
cultures. Through diplomatic - nation to nation - exchanges,
5. See S. MORISON, THE.OXFORD HISTORY OF THE-AMERICAN PEOPLE 17-33 (1965) (discussing the
European discovery of America).
6. In the early years of the New World conquest, in their search for valuable minerals, the
Spanish often attempted to enslave indigenous people, imposing the system know as encomienda;
settlement was generally not a primary goal but religious conversion was. See L. HANKE, THE.
SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE- CONQUEST OF AMERICA 19-20, 23-25 (1965). In contrast,
Englishmen came as permanent settlers, the French as traders, missionaries, and sometimes settlers,
but neither made Native Americans subject people in the early years of settlement. The Spanish
crown established a highly centralized law to govern Spanish America. S. MoisoN, supra note 5, at
38. The British Crown, however, was far more lackadaisical in the concern paid to centralized
control of colonial-Native American interactions. Id.
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land boundaries were outlined and trade relations encouraged.
Western European nations also vied for political and military
alliances with certain tribes, occasionally causing the Native
Americans, ironically, to become agents in the Europeans' struggle
to dominate the North American continent.
When the United States Government came into existence, a
body of law already existed that incorporated many of the premises
upon which the Nation built its legal and political relationship with
the Native American governments of the continent. Indeed, the use
of law in dealings with tribes was a central premise inherited from
European colonial governments.
A. THE-SPANISH

The Europeans' use of law as one principle of foreign relations
with Native American governments had a long history. 7 Shortly
after the Spanish began explorations of the New World, the
Spanish monarchy applied for, and obtained, an official document
from the Pope known as a papal bull - Inter Caetera of May 3,
1493 - by which the Spanish Crown received "forever" all that
Columbus had discovered. 8 In these early years of exploration, the
Papacy functioned both to assign lands, and to delimit a theological
law of nations and relations with indigenous people. 9 Throughout
the sixteenth century, Spanish rulers convened formal boards of
inquiry to consider what, if any, rights were due the indigenous
people of the newly discovered continent. These inquiries focused
upon what actions, including war and enslavement, could be
properly pursued in the name of Christianity and the Crown.' 0
In the broadest sense, two positions developed out of these
inquiries. One school argued that the so-called Indians were
inferior or even inhuman and, thus., marked from birth for
subjugation. 1 In contrast, even as they acknowledged the Indian as
7. See W. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND, WHITE MAN'S LAW 3 (1971).
8. W. WASHBURN, supra note 7, at 5; L. HANKE, supra note 6, at 25.
9. W. WASHBURN, supra note 7, at 4-6; AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, TASK
FORCE
ONE: TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE- FEDERAL-INDIAN
RELATIONSHIP 88-90 (1976)
[hereinafter THE-FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP]. This theological law was influential only among
certain Catholic heads of state. Id. at 89. Anti-Catholic bias led governments as well as jurists to
disclaim the influence of the Spanish and the Catholic Church in the development of law as it applied
to the treatment of indigenous people. Id. at 89.
10. See F. DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IVRE BEI.1 RELECTIONES 120, 143 (E. Nys ed. 1917); L.
HANKE, supra note 6, at 25-26.
11. L. HANKE, supra note 6, at 1I. Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo was among the school that
believed Indians were inferior to whites, as evidenced by his following statement:

[The Indians are] naturally lazy and vicious, melancholic, cowardly, and in general a
lying, shiftless people. Their marriages are not a sacrament but a sacrilege. They are
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a primitive nonbeliever in need of conversion, theologians and
missionaries like Franciscus de Victoria and Bartolome de Las
Casas asserted a message of brotherhood, and Indian sovereignty
12
and property rights.
Victoria's writings, emphasizing the Indians' right to be
recognized as the "true owners" of the lands they occupied, whose
"dominion can not be denied to them" set a critical tone in the
debate.' 3 Victoria wrote that "even those who attribute lordship
over the world to the Emperor do not claim that he is lord in
ownership, but only in jurisdiction, and this latter right does not go
so far as to warrant him converting provinces to his own use or in
giving towns or even estates away at his pleasure." ' 14 Victoria's
analysis granted that Europeans held a right to travel, trade, and
declare the Gospel among the Indians under the law of nations and
divine law, but he denied that discovery by the Spanish conveyed
title to Indian land since the Indians already owned such land. 5
Victoria also argued that barring a just war, as defined by the law
of nations, the Spanish Crown could not wage war against Indians
and therefore could not claim any rights by conquest. 16 Although
not always heeded by his own government, Victoria's opinions
influenced the development of an international law of exploration
in the following two centuries - a body of law that had to be
reckoned with by the new government of the United States in the
formulation of original principles of Indian law. I7
idolatrous, libidinous and commit sodomy. Their chief desire is to eat, drink, worship
heathen idols, and commit bestial obscenities. What could one expect from a people
whose skulls are so thick and hard that the Spaniards had to take care in fighting not to
strike on the head least their swords be blunted?
Id.
12. Id. Bartolome de Las Casas was among the "noble Indian" group, as evidenced when he
stated:
God created these simple people without evil and without guile. They are most
obedient and faithful to their natural lords and to the Christians whom they serve.
They are most submissive, patient, peaceful and virtuous. Nor are they quarrelsome,
rancorous, querulous or vengeful. Moreover, they are more delicate than princes and
die easily from work or illness. They neither possess nor desire to possess worldly
wealth. Surely these people would be the most blessed in the world if only they
worshipped the true God.
Id.
13. F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 10, at 128.
14. Id. at 134.
15. Id. at 139.
16. Id. at 143-44.
17. Victoria's theories received support in the papal bull of 1537 and later in the Spanish Laws
of the Indies (1594) which, in turn, are part ofa body of law that comes to have importance as moral
force and specifically, as provisions, in treaties. See THE.FEDERAL- INDIAN RELATIONSHIP, supra note 9,
at 90. United States federal Indian law, in turn, was influenced by this body of thought and law. Id.
A United States Task Force has stated:
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THE DUTCH AND THE BRITISH

By political example and legal treatise, the Dutch and then the
British also influenced the early development of United States
Indian law contributing, among other legal principles, the practice
of acquiring Native American land by treaty. The Dutch followed
this path in order not to antagonize Native Americans as trading
partners.1 8 Felix Cohen has argued that the Dutch practice of
entering treaties for Native American land expressed three critical
premises, articulated in the early seventeenth century document
prepared for the Dutch West Indies Company, which declared: (1)
that both parties to the treaty were sovereign powers; (2) that the
Indian tribe had a transferable title to the land under discussion;
and (3) that the acquisition of Indian lands could not be left to
individual colonists but must be controlled by the larger institution
of government, or the Crown itself. 19
Great Britain also made efforts to acquire land by treaty, but
British colonists, at least the large landowners, generally were not
cooperative. Roger Williams was one of the few who "dared to
dismiss European claims to American soil as unjustified and illegal
if the prior right of the Indian was not recognized." ' 20 Full title,
according to the Rhode Island leader, resided in the tribe. Greed
apparently prevailed, however, as defiant Englishmen negotiated
illegal land deals creating chaos in Native American and colonial
communities.2 1 The Crown periodically attempted to assert direct
The Spanish law and Catholic doctrines do have fundamental importance to the
questions of Indian affairs.. partly because of their past presence in territories which
ultimately were to become part of the United States;...because their prior laws have
relevance to rights succeeding their departure or land cessions to other nations; and
because of the provisions of treaties between the various nations affecting the rights of
Indian people.
Id. Cohen argued that Victoria's declaration of human rights is restated in the Northwest Ordinance.
Id. He also writes that while Victoria was not directly cited in early opinions of the United States
Supreme Court, opinions dealing with Native American property rights and sovereignty often refer
to the writings of Grotius and Vattel "that are either copied or adapted from the words of Victoria."
F. COHEN, THE.LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S.COHEN 248 (1960).
18. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47 (1942).
19. Id.
20. Washburn, The Moral and Legal Justifications for Dispossessing the Indians, SEVENTEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 15, 25 (Smith ed. 1959). As early as 1684, colonial New York required approval
by the Governor of individual land purchases from tribal governments. Clinton & Hotopp, Judicial
Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31
ME. L. REV. 17, 21 (1979).
21. Some land deals with Native Americans who did not know the language and terms of land
agreements were characterized by fraud. Competition among colonists and lack of centralized
control by the Crown also resulted in overlapping claims. Government and speculators, for example,
would sell land to immigrants. F. COHEN, supra note 18, at 47; G. NAMMACK, FRAUD, POLITICS, AND
THE.DISPOSSESSION OF THE.INDIANS: THE.IRoQUoIS LAND FRONTIER IN THE.COLONIAL PERIOD 17-18
(1969); F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE.FORMATIVE YEARS 6 (1962); W. WASHBURN,
subra note 7, at 41.
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central control of land policy in order to encourage the orderly
growth of the empire. It worried, for example, that the purchase of
property within tribal territory by individual colonists placed these
British subjects under tribal authority. 22 The British government
also saw the legal instrument of treaties as a way of keeping peace
with tribal governments and, thus, keeping the tribes out of the
French political orbit. 23 Neither of these foreign governments
worried that indigenous systems of law 4held fundamentally
2
different notions of, for example, land tenure.
III. REVOLUTIONARY AND TRANSITION YEARS
The new Americans had no doubts about the propriety of
asserting western law as the legal linguafranca of negotiations with
Native Americans. In addition they felt the need for legal relations
reflected acceptance of earlier colonial practice. Moreover, the use
of law also expressed an understanding, at least on the part of most
national officials, of the impossibility of conquering the tribal
governments. Physically exhausted from the war with England,
lacking a national treasury, and still facing competition from
European sovereigns, the early decades of the American Republic
were marked by a pragmatic appreciation of the utility and
necessity of lawful and diplomatic relations with tribal
22. R. BARSH &J. HENDERSON, THE-ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 37 (1980). In
1753 the Board of Trade in London began instructing certain colonial governors that they should bar
future purchases of Indian land by private individuals. 1 F. PRUCHA, THE.GREAT FATHER 22 (1984).
This order was generalized in 1761. Id. Preliminary steps were taken in 1755 to remove Indian affairs
from the colonial governments and to centralize political control in the imperial government. Id. at
21. In a major effort to establish a central policy for the management of Indian affairs, George Ill
announced in 1763 a formal boundary between the British colonies and the Indian nations to the
West and ordered that no warrants for survey or patents for lands be issued beyond this line. Id. at
23. A year later the Board of Trade proposed a plan for the licensing of trade with the Indian nations,
but the plan was never formally adopted. Id. at 26.
23. G. NAMMACK, supra note 21, at 17. The European crowns-of-state who sought to establish
colonial empires in the New World understood the potential political and military weight of the
Indian nations. See G. BEER, BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 252 (1907). In the war of the French and
British in 1754, and in our own Revolutionary War, Indian nations were wooed by both sides as
allies who could make a difference in the outcome of war.
24. Native Americans shared neither the Europeans' feudal nor common law traditions
regarding sovereignty and property. Nor had they been permitted to contribute to the development
of the so-called "international" law of nations. The indigenous tribes had no knowledge of Victoria,
Vattel, Blackstone or Locke. But they had, with variations, legal systems of their.own. For the most
part, these indigenous systems of law stressed communal use of land by related people and individual
use of personal property. Systems of citizenship, decision-making, and leadership varied: there were
small and organizationally simple tribes like the Shoshone, aggressively competitive people like the
Kwakiutl, and large supernations perhaps best represented by the Iroquois League. The European
value of trading land as capital was alien to Native American tribes. See generally P. FARB, MAN'S RISE
TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE. INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA

FROM PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE.

COMING OF THE.INDUSTRIAL STATE 3-9 (1968) (discussing the diversity of customs, laws, and beliefs
among the various Indian tribes).
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governments. 25 The United States nonetheless ignored Native
American systems of law and what they might have contributed to
an international law of property and jurisdiction for the North
American continent, proceeding rather with a Euro-centric
inquiry-an inquiry that sought principles, to allocate power and
property among four sets of governments: The Indian nations, the
United States and its state governments, and the European
"competitors."
The European nations had treated tribal governments as
sovereign political communities. The Continental Congress
adopted this principle of nation to nation diplomacy, seeking
treaties of peace and friendship with tribal governments. Such
relations were not easily accomplished, however, as the British had
already drawn many tribes into alliances. 26 In addition, many
tribes were "as reluctant as other nations to stake their future on an
untried, radical 'new order'. '"27 Nevertheless, the revolutionary
government negotiated a small number of treaties of nonaggression
and friendship, including one with the Delaware Tribe in
September of 1778,28 and the alliances with northeastern tribes
whose fighting significantly affected the outcome of the war and
ultimate land boundaries.
During this period the Continental Congress struggled to
wrestle control of the surveying, sale, and governance of western
lands (Indian lands) from both state governments and private land
companies. Fears of lost revenue, as well as political hegemony, led
the national government to establish a frontier policy. A policy was
spelled out first in a 1783 proclamation of the Continental
Congress, 29 and later in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, by which
the Congress sought to establish nationally directed Indian
30
relations, and to establish peace.
25. The Continental Congress, and subsequently the government of the United States,
conducted nation to nation diplomacy with Native American governments. Alliances were sought
with certain Indian governments in the war against Great Britain. Treaties became the primary
mechanism of legal relations beginning with the 1778 treaty of alliance with the Delaware nation. See
Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware Indians, 7 Stat. 13; see also F.
COHEN, supra note 18, at 47-62 (discussing a history of Indian treaties).
26. F. PRUCHA, supra note 21, at 10, 26-28.
27. R. BARSH &J. HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 32. Prucha comments that in contrast to the
land purchase and. trade abuses of local colonists, the concerned record of imperial officials disposed
the tribes to the Crown rather than the Continental Congress. F. PRUCHA, supra note 22, at 39-40.
28. Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, United States-Delaware Nation, 7 Stat. 13.
29. See Proclamation of the Continental Congress, Sept. 22, 1783, JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 24:264 and 25:602 (1922).
30. Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. Specifically, article III of the
Northwest Ordinance provides, in relevant part:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property,
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As the first full policy statement governing relations with
Native American governments, the Northwest Ordinance was
critical to the development of a federal Indian law. 31 The ordinance
created what a United States commission subsequently described as
a "principled .'bill of rights' for the Indian Tribes, declaring 'their
property, rights and liberty' as being inviolate to unconsented
invasions or disturbances. ' 32 It is notable that a 1537 papal bull
was, almost word for word, the source of that part of the Ordinance
dealing with Native American relations. 3 Together with the
treaties of peace and friendship, the Northwest Ordinance affirmed
an early framework of relations built upon the laws of nations. It
also underscored the central role of the national government rather
than state governments, or private companies, in the conduct of
diplomacy and law with tribal governments.
The same year, the Constitutional Convention confirmed this
principle of national relations by assigning Congress the power "to
regulate commerce.. .with the Indian Tribes." 34 The assignation of
such power to the national government followed logically from
earlier policy: In 1775 the incipient American Government had
divided "Indian country" into three departments for the purpose
of nationally directed trade and diplomacy, and the 1777 Articles of
Confederation specifically provided for the national direction of
33
relations between the new confederation and tribal governments.
rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from
time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving
peace and friendship with them.

Id. at 52. Men like Washington, Knox, and Jefferson were instrumental in the development of these
policies. F. PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 1, 11, 21 (1975). Washington, for
example, wrote to James Duane, on September 7, 1783: "I am'clear in my opinion, that policy and
economy point very strongly to the expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the
propriety of purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them by force of arms out of
their Country.... In a word there is nothing to be obtained by an Indian War but the Soil they live on
and this can be had by purchase at less expence [sic], and without that bloodshed...." Id. at 2.
31. See Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
32. FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIE, supra note 9, at 81.
33. Id. at 90. Dominican Bernardino de Minaya travelled from Peru to Rome seeking Pope Paul
III's support of a policy prohibiting exploitation of the Indians of the New World. W. WASHBURN,
supra note 7, at 13. After Minaya's audience with the Pope, the Pope issued a papal bull, Sublimis
Deus, onJune 9, 1537, providing in part:
[T]he said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are
by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even
though they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ... nor should they be in any way
enslaved; should the contrary happen it shall be null and of no effect.
Id.
34. U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8, cl.3.
35. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, para. 4 (1777). Article IX, paragraph 4 of the Articles
of Confederation provided, in relevant part:
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Congress made immediate use of this power by writing the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 which mandated federal
approval of any purchase of tribal land3 6 - a move meant to end
the practice of state governments entering diplomatic relations and
obtaining land cessions from tribal governments. 37 To regulate the
activities of American traders, which often destabilized and
confounded United States-Native American diplomacy, the statute
further initiated a trade licensing system. 38 The Trade and
Intercourse Act also codified existing treaties,3 9 a victory for those
who argued the wisdom of applying the standards of international
law to all dealings with Native American nations.
Thus, in laws of its own making, the early United States
Government asserted the sovereign national status of Native
American tribes. The United States sought out tribal governments
for the purpose of international treaties of alliance, as well as for the
legal transfer of title to land. Read together, these treaties, the
Northwest Ordinance and the Trade and Intercourse Act,
expressed principles of an early federal Indian law. These
principles represented a critical commitment to law over raw power
at precisely the time when the pressure for more land among whites
was growing, and questionable land speculation deals were on the
rise in the United States. 40 Indeed, land was a major source of
capital for both the states and the new nation. Several states had
financed their Revolutionary War costs through the sale of Indian
land grants. 4 1 In the first case discussed below, Fletcher v. Peck, 42 one
reason Georgia was anxious to accept the bid made by land
speculators was her desperate need for funds with which to pay the
43
militia.
The competition for tribal land among whites prompted the
United States Supreme Court to discuss federal Indian law, and
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive right
and power of regulating the... trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not
members of any of the States; provided that the legislative right of any State, within its
own limits, be not infringed or violated....
Id. The Articles of Confederation were not ratified and in force until 1781 because Maryland had
refused to ratify. F. PRUCHA, supra note 21, at 31.
36. Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. S 177 (1982)).
37. Seeid. at 137.

38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See id.; Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50; Indian Trade & Intercourse
Act,July22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (codifiedas amended at 25 U.S.C. S 177 (1982)).
41. Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201 (1839).
42. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
43. C. MAGRATH, YAzoo -

v. PECK 14 (1966).

LAW AND POLITICS IN THE.NEw REPUBLIC: THE.CASE OF FLETCHER
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caused the Court to address questions of tribal property rights and
tribal sovereignty. When the Court entered this discussion, it was
an institution of a nation whose leaders had not asserted the
conquest of tribal governments, and who understood that the
nation lacked the power to do so. At the same time, as de
Tocqueville observed in 1830, the nation understood that the law
need not be an impotent weapon in the pursuit of hemispheric
4
political and economic goals. 4

IV.

ENTER THE COURT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
DOCTRINE IN FLETCHER, WILSON ANDJOHNSON
A.

THE-YAZOO CASE: FLETCHER V. PECK

Supreme Court involvement in federal Indian law began with
Fletcher v. Peck, 45 the famous 1810 case best described as a squabble
among thieves, and best known in law as the case first used by the
Court to extol the sanctity of vested rights in property and thus to
46
secure broad meaning to the contract clause.
The "Yazoo" case grew out of aggressive, and fraudulent,
speculative schemes in western (Native American) land claimed by
the state of Georgia. The litigation has been described as a
"collusive suit, . . . an arranged case between friendly 'adversaries'. .. ,47 Legal action followed the passage of a law by the
Georgia Legislature repealing a statute by which the state had sold
hundreds of thousands of acres to the New England Mississippi
Land Company - of which John Peck was director. 4 Peck had
divided the land and resold it at considerable profit to, among
others, Robert Fletcher.4 9 The repeal law called into question the
44. See I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 368-69 (1945). De Tocqueville wrote:

The Spaniards pursued the Indians with bloodhounds, like wild beasts... .The conduct
of the Americans of the United States towards the aborigines is characterized, on the
other hand, by a singular attachment to the formalities of law. [They pursued Indian
extinction and deprivation of rights] with a singular felicity.. .and without violating a
single great principle of morality... It is impossible to destroy men with more respect

for the'laws of humanity.
Id.

45. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
46. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142 (1810). For a full discussion of the history
and politics of Fletcherv. Peck, see C. MAGRATH, supra note 43, at 14.
47. C. MAGRATH, .supra note 43, at 54-55. To test often complex land title schemes, the
Americans had further developed the British practice of actions of ejectment with fictional
adversaries. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 22-23, 64-65 (2d ed. 1985). These pleas

were widespread in use and reflected no disrepute on the character of the parties. Id.
48. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 127-29.
49. See id. at 127.
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legitimacy of all title alienated pursuant to the repealed statute. 50
Robert Fletcher sued John Peck in federal court, using the court's
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, for a "covenant broken"
because he had sold him "that which he did not rightfully
possess.''51 From the litigants' perspective, the validity of
Georgia's action voiding the land grants formed the core issue in
the suit. Men like Fletcher and Peck stood to lose considerable sums
if the high court upheld the repeal bill. 52 Invoking the sanctity of
contract, however, the Court invalidated the repealing statute, thus
53
satisfying both men's claims.
Indian governments were not direct parties to the case.
However, since the land sold originally by Georgia had not been
transferred from the tribes by treaty, and since it was not clear
whether the disputed land fell within the boundaries of either the
United States or Georgia, the Court addressed the question of the
legal status of Indian land as it related to the issues of the Yazoo
litigation. 54
Critically, Marshall's majority opinion acknowledged a
property right he described as "Indian title," thus establishing for
the first time at least a patina of judicial protection - a legitimate
legal status for Indian land under American law. 55 Having
"Indian title," what specific rights did the tribes hold under
international law, or the developing federal law of land tenure? The
Court described it as a title "certainly to be respected by all courts"
until extinguished, and urged only legitimate extinguishment of
title.5 6 In short, the justices affirmed the prerequisite of tribal
consent to the extinguishment of Indian title, a critically important
principle for the protection of Native American property rights
dating to the earliest laws of the European colonies in North
America, one incorporated by the United States in its Northwest
Ordinance. 57 It was conceded, however, to be only a title of
occupancy. 58 In the concluding phrase of the opinion, Marshall
wrote that Indian title "is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to
seisin in fee on the part of the state. 59
50. Id. at 127-28.
51. C. MAGRATH, supra note 43, at 53-54; see Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 128.
52. C. MAGRATH, supra note 43, at 53-54.
53. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139.
54. See id.at 139-43.
55. See id.at 142.
56. Id.at 142-43.
57. Cohen, Original Indian Title,
32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 39-40 (1947); seeNorthwest Ordinance,
July 13, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. For language of the Northwest Ordinance concerning consent, see
supra note 30.
58. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142.
59. Id.at 142-43.
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The principle that Indian title was not one of fee simple but
60
only occupancy drew upon the so-called "doctrine of discovery."
The doctrine of discovery was generally understood as a rule
initiated by European nations, at the time of exploration of the
New World, to govern these new international relations. To avoid
the possibility of overlapping and conflicting settlements, the
earliest discoverer obtained the right - against later arrivals - to
acquire unoccupied land. 61 The doctrine was a distributional
principle that had a succession of interpreters including Victoria,
Vattel, Montesquieu, and Blackstone. 62 The doctrine came to be a
rationale for the taking of land and, as such, has been described as
an "alien European theor[y] that w[as] imposed on the native
population' "63
In the view of the Supreme Court, as the legatee of discovery
by earlier Europeans, the state of Georgia had obtained fee simple
title and thus, for the purposes of the case, could grant patents to
the land even though the state could not eject the tribes. 64 A host of
practical and complex questions arose from this distributive
formulation assigning dual, or split, property rights to the
discoverer nation on the one hand, and Indian nations on the other,
but the Fletcher opinion did not address such questions. This was
apparently because the Court feared an examination of the political
character of Indian nations and their land rights would distract
from the more central discussion of the contract clause and federal
judicial review of state legislation. 65 As the result of the dual
property rights assigned, and the Court's failure to address the
question of tribal dominion, the Court's attempt in Fletcher to build
a lexicon of tribal property rights can only be characterized as
tentative and inconclusive. The justices, however, may have been
well satisfied with the decision which, from their perspective,
simultaneously promoted interests of the national government, the
states, and Indian nations.
60. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST FOR
SURVIVAL 16 (1981) [hereinafter INDIAN TRIBES].
61. Id. Pursuant to the doctrine of discovery, unoccupied land included land not occupied by
Europeans. Id.
62. Id. at 16-17; see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107-08; B. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE.
SPIRIT OF LAWS 281-84 (D. Carrithers ed. 1977); E. VATTEL, THE.LAW OF NATIONS 98-101, 170-71
(J. Chitty ed. 1883); F. DE VICTORIA, supra note 10, at 120. For a clear discussion of Blackstone's
interpretation of the discovery doctrine, see Bennett, Aboriginal Title in the Common Law: A Stony Path
Through FeudalDoctrine, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 617, 627-34 (1978).
63. INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 60, at 16.
64. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142 (1810). The court in Fletcher stated: "It is the
opinion of the court, that the particular land stated in the declaration appears... to lie within the state
of Georgia, and that the state of Georgia had power to grant it." Id.
65. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27
BUFFALO L. REV. 637, 642 (1978).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64:73

Tilting toward the Republic, the Court outlined tribal land
rights limited to occupancy, with no right of alienation and,
therefore, compromised in the context of United States property
law. 66 However, on behalf of the tribes, Marshall's opinion
asserted a legal right of occupancy that protected the residency of
individual tribal meinbers as well as the- communal character of
tribes. 67 In addition, Fletcher also invoked a tribal right of consent
before the extinguishment of this occupancy right. But finally,
looking to the interests of states, the Court hazarded that Georgia
was seised in fee for tribal land and, thus, was also in possession of a
significant property right. 68 Viewed together, this tripartite
balancing of rights suggests a Court seeking safe but principled
ground at a time when the position of the Supreme Court in the
69
American political system was far from secure.
Justice Johnson, however, sharply disagreed that the Fletcher
majority had laid down acceptable principles of law with respect to
Native American sovereignty and property rights. 70 His dissent
minced few words in concluding that Marshall had misapplied the
law and misunderstood the true nature of tribal dominion and
concomitant rights of property. 7 1 Reluctantly addressing a question
he characterized as one of "much delicacy.. .more fitted for a
diplomatic or legislative than a judicial inquiry," Johnson argued
that the "national fires" of the tribes in question had not been
extinguished and they retained "absolute proprietorship of their
soil."72
Moreover, Johnson
noted
that
"[i]nnumerable
treaties... acknowledge [the Indians] to be an independent people,
and the uniform practice of acknowledging their right to soil, by
purchasing from them, and restraining all persons from
encroaching upon their territory, makes it unnecessary to insist
73
upon their right to soil."
66. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 142.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 142-43.
69. One hundred and fifty years after the Fletcher decision, a United States Task Force
commented upon a central difficulty with the majority's solution:
By Fletcher...the national government was encouraged to pursue its methods of
extinguishing Indian title to lands by the process of public treaties. Georgia, on the
other hand, was encouraged to regard Indian rights and property claims as being very
tenuous in nature; or insufficient in force to prevent the succeeding legislative assault
against them by that State in its famed controversies with the Cherokee Nation.
THE.FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIe, supra note 9, at 75.
70. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 146 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 146.
73. Id. at 146-47.
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Directing his inquiry to the critical question, Johnson asked,
"Can, then, one nation be said to be seised of a fee-simple in lands,
the right of soil of which is in another nation?" 7 4 Having stated that
the tribes were "absolute proprietors," Justice Johnson argued the
position that would be established as a fundamental principle of
75
federal Indian law twenty-two years later in Worcester v. Georgia:
"Unaffected by particular treaties, [the discoverer's interest], is
nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the
country,... a right of conquest, or of purchase .... All the restrictions
upon the right of soil in the Indians, amount only to an exclusion of
all competitors from their markets,... a pre-emptive right [of the
discoverer]. ' 7 6 Then, in a curious twist of politics and
jurisprudence, Justice Johnson - an appointee of Jefferson disputed John Marshall's conclusion that this pre-emptive right
could be vested in a state.7 7 Rather, he argued, it is a right vested
only in the United States following the cession, "by the
constitution, [of] both the power of pre-emption and of
78
conquest."
B. NEW JERSEY v. WILSON
The next opportunity for Supreme Court analysis of tribal
property rights and tribal sovereignty occurred two years after
Fletcher in New Jersey v. Wilson, 79 a case again involving nontribal
litigants. In 1758 a band of the Delaware Indians ceded a large
parcel of land to the colony of New Jersey in exchange for taxexempt, reserved lands.8 0 Forty years later the tribes sold this
reserved land with the consent of the New Jersey Legislature., 1 The
state subsequently resold the land and, a year later, repealed its tax
exemption.8 2 The non-Indian purchasers appealed this change in
tax status first to state courts and then to the United States
3
Supreme Court.
Marshall's opinion for the Court is most interesting for its
near avoidance of the Indian question. Framing the issue as
74. Id. at 147.
75. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1831). For a discussion of Worcester, see infra notes 176-222 and
accompanying text.
76. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 147 (Johnson,J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
80. NewJersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164, 165 (1812).
81. Id. at 165-66.
82. Id. at 166.
83. Id. The NewJersey Supreme Court determined that the act repealing the tax exemption was
valid, and declared the land liable to taxation. Id.
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impairment of contract, and discussing the constitutional
implications of such a clause, the Chief Justice failed to discuss
directly the pressing question of tribal sovereignty or property
rights, writing only that the original colonial purchase would quiet
the title of the extensive claims of the Indians. 84 By its silence and
by implication, the Court accepted that the rights of the new
landowners were identical to those of the tribes originally granted
the tax exemption - both mere landowners, neither sovereigns.
Nothing in the Court's words challenged New Jersey's assertion
that it need not have granted the exemption to the Delaware,
supporting the conclusion that the justices believed the state to hold
85
the ultimate fee or dominion of the tribe's territory.
C. JOHNSON V. M'INTOSH: -POSSESSORY INTEREST BUT NOT
PROPERTY INTEREST

The third case in this sequence,Johnson v. M'Intosh,86 has been
called one of the "most misunderstood cases in the AngloAmerican law." ' 87 In addition, it has also become one of the most
controversial in the field of federal Indian law.
As in Fletcher and Wilson which were decided a decade earlier,
Johnson confronted the Marshall Court with the difficulties of
outlining legal doctrine expressive of what the United States
characterized as its "unique" relationship with Indian nations,
unique because, unable to conquer the tribes, the United States
continued its nation to nation political dealings while at the same
time asserting an unmitigated racial and cultural superiority. 8 It is
also argued that the Johnson decision was burdened with Marshall's
interest in developing an "Americanized law of real property." '89
84. Id.
85. R. BARSH &J. HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 39.

86. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
87. Berman, supra note 65, at 655.
88. Id. at 650. The speeches and literature of Europeans and early citizens of the United States
were rife with expressions of racial and cultural superiority. The language of justification for the
taking of Native American land drew upon Vattel and others who stressed the supremacy of the
pastoral-agricultural life over that of the hunter-gathered and who usually misunderstood or did not
mentior) the Native Americans who created towns. See E. VATTEL, supra note 62, at 100-01.
Moreover, the Indian was portrayed as an animal and a savage. Id. Authors varied as to whether the
Indian could be civilized. See R. DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE.METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING AND
EMPIRE BUILDING 126-27 (1980) (referring to Indians as varmints); Brackenridge, "The Animals,
Vulgarly Called Indians," in THE.INDIAN AND THE.WHITE MAN 116 (W. Wasburn ed. 1964) (stating
that the torturing Indians do to their bodies, justifies their extermination); see generally R.
BERKHOFER, THE.WHITE MAN'S INDIAN (1979) (discussing the various conceptions by whites of the
Native Americans).
89. Berman, supra note 65, at 643. Professor Berman argues that Johnson as part of an early
effort to free the law of real property from the restrictions of status relationships grounded in
European concepts of feudal tenures. Id. at 643 n.31. Berman states:
By qualifying the issues raised in cases concerning land acquisition from Indian
nations in real property terms, Marshall was able to create a law of real property that
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The opinion defined property rights - or possessory interests and articulated principles of a newly limited tribal sovereignty.
Unfortunately, this was accomplished in language that is vague and
confusing in key passages. Thus, it is not surprising that Johnson is
often misunderstood.
The controversy in Johnson involved land claimed by the
plaintiffs as the result of direct tribal grants in 1773 and 1775 and
by the M'Intosh faction as the result of a later United States patent
obtained after the lands in question were ceded to the federal
government by the same tribes. 90 Whether because they did not
share western notions of ownership, or for other reasons, the tribes
.had sold the same land twice. 9 1 Although it involved no tribal
litigants, the case required that the Court determine whether a
grant of tribal land obtained by a non-Indian purchaser without the
approval of the federal government conveyed a title to be respected
in courts of the United States. 92 Regardless of the Court's decision,
there would be no immediate tribal "losers" since either way title
would be held by whites. In a larger sense, however, tribal
prerogatives were very much at issue as the case posed the question
of whether tribes could convey title without the consent of the
discovering nation.
In Fletcher the Court had argued that the state of Georgia, as
legatee of discovery, had fee simple title to the land in question
93
rather than the tribes who occupied it.
The opinion contained no
further explanation of alienation rights or other questions of
dominion. The Fletcher decision was, however, firmly grounded in
the discovery principle. 94 In Johnson, the Chief Justice worked from
this previously enunciated doctrine, applying it now in the Court's
first full-blown interpretation of the nature of tribal sovereignty as
well as tribal property rights under United States law.
As described, discovery had been a convention of intraEuropean diplomacy intended to keep colonial powers from
overlapping land claims. In Johnson, Marshall undermined the
original doctrine, transforming it into a principle of United Statesarose directly trom territorial claims within the United States, which could be
interpreted according to principles derived from the 'natural law' philosophy ofJohn
Locke.

Id.
90.Johnson v. M'intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 550-60 (1823).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 555-58, 572.

93. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139-40 (1810). For a discussion of Fletcher, see supra
notes 45-78 and accompanying text.
94. Id. For a discussion of the discovery principle, see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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Indian relations. Marshall now described the discovery doctrine as
not only giving the discoverer the "exclusive right.. .to appropriate
the lands occupied by the Indians," ' 95 but also creating the
"considerable"
impairment of the rights of these original
inhabitants. The Indians, he wrote, are "the rightful occupants of
the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it,
and to use it according to their own discretion...,' but "their rights
to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will,
to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those
who made it. "96 Johnson thus stands for the principle that Indian
title is not one that conveys the right to alienate land - only the
holder of fee simple title may alienate, and correspondingly, that
tribal sovereignty has been diminished by this limitation upon
tribal power. 97
Yet even as the Court denied this ultimate alienation right to
the tribes in favor of the discoverer and her patentee, the Court
found that the discovery doctrine simultaneously conveyed the
right of perpetual occupancy and "use according to their own
discretion" to the holder of Indian title. 98 Because the Court
extracted these dual political rights and property titles, Johnson has
been called both a "brilliant compromise" 99 as well as an opinion
"seiz[ing] upon this controversy to establish a judicial mythology
that would rationalize the origin of land titles in the United
States.' 100
Using legal concepts alien to tribal law, the Court built a
theory of land title sympathetic to the interest of the Republic. 1 1
Not only did the Supreme Court deny the validity of a transaction
entered into by an Indian nation, but, by virtue of the chain of
discovery rights, a property transaction that had occurred before
the Revolutionary War and the creation of the Republic. 10 2 To
95.Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 584.
96. Id. at 574.
97. Id. at 604-05. The plaintiffs failed in their appeal, the Supreme Court determining that title,
having been obtained by individuals without the approval of the federal government, could not be
sustained in federal court. Id.
98. Id. at 574.
99. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1223
(1980).
100. Berman, supra note 65, at 643.
101. Id. at 646. Berman argues that Marshall very deliberately chose the discovery doctrine over
other available legal theories upon which to rest this new law of property and diminished tribal
sovereignty. See id. Berman states that "[a]n extensive literature on the law of nations existed
concerning the rights of non-European peoples.. Vattel, Grotius, Puffendorf .. [and] were
introduced in the pleadings of Fletcher v. Peck and Johnson v. McIntosh to argue the validity of Indian
sovereignty." Id.
102. W. Veeder, Suppression of Indian Tribal Sovereignty 14 (1973) (unpublished manuscript).
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91

achieve legitimacy for the real property claims of the Republic,
Marshall devised prerogatives for the discovering nation that
reached into tribal dominion and created a political power and a
tribal land title of lesser force. Indian title became one of occupancy
and use, not title absolute and complete. 10 3 In this calculus,
however, neither had the United States obtained a title "absolute
and complete" because its title, in turn, was subject to the Indian
104
title of occupancy."
The Court's opinion in Johnson forwarded important
principles of federal Indian law at a critical moment in United
States history. Facing increasing resistance to land cessions from
eastern tribal nations, uncertain of new colonial ventures on the
part of France, Spain, and Russia, and in need of a solidified
American law of real property to protect the Republic against all
these parties (not to speak of American investors), Marshall knew
the political, economic, and moral stakes of the Court's work were
indescribable. 105 For the first time, the Court inJohnson had applied
10 6
the principle of parallel property interests enunciated in Fletcher.
Yet the Court did not satisfy anyone's expectation for a thorough
definition of either property rights or each sovereign's political
powers. Perhaps, because the stakes were so high, the Court could
not afford to be too precise.
Adding to the muddle of possessory rights versus ultimate
property rights, halfway through the opinion the Court introduced
dicta describing a theory of conquest presumably meant to ratify
0 7
rights already asserted through the doctrine of discovery.1
Generally, this dicta has been accepted as the Court's statement of
103. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
104. Id. at 592.
105. Numerous events of international politics as they affected the New World must have
weighed on the Court as it wrote an American law of real property: The birth of several new
republics in South America had caused concern about intervention in Latin America by the
European Holy Alliance; French invasion of Spain in 1823 gave it access to Spain's colonial empire;
the United States had only recently obtained all of Spain's holdings east of the Mississippi together
with her claim to Oregon country; and Russia was pushing her trading posts from Alaska toward San
Francisco Bay. S. MORISON & H.. COMMAGER, 1 THE.GROWTH OF THE.AMERICAN REPUBLIC 452-57
(1962).
106. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810);Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 596.
For a discussion of Fletcher, see supra notes 45-78 and accompanying text. For a discussion ofJohnson,
see supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
107. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587-90. Marshall wrote:
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny....[T]he tribes of
Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war.... to
leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to
govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were... ready to repel
by arms every attempt on their independence. What was the inevitable
consequence...? The Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the
country,.. or of enforcing those claims by the sword....
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United States conquest of Indian nations. Asserting conquest of
Native American nations stands as a curious reasoning because it
was unnecessary for purposes of claiming title. Moreover, it was
not credible in a political context. The historical record shows
clearly that most of the lands alienated to the United States were
acquired by purchase rather than military action. 108 Marshall's
dicta may, nonetheless, have been aimed at appeasing anti-tribal
opinion in the United States. The reference to conquest may have
been included as a conceit, a metaphor of European superiority. It
permitted Marshall to discuss the Indian as a savage, and to imply
that, had the conquest doctrine been used more fully as the basis of
the opinion, tribal governments might have been granted even
fewer rights.
Moreover, it is also possible that the strongly nationalist
Marshall presented conquest as a salvo to accompany the Monroe
Doctrine. 10 9 Apprehension had been high in Washington over a
joint French and Spanish expedition into South America, as well as
the intentions of the Russians in the northwest. While President
Adams mulled his foreign policy options, the Chief Justice may
have asserted conquest as an additional statement of American
independence and warning against further European colonization.
The Johnson decision established, or extended from Fletcher,
three interwoven principles of federal Indian law: the existence of
Indian occupancy title, the discovering nation's exclusive right of
extinguishing Indian title, and the requirement of Indian consent
for such extinguishment. The decision did not assert any right to
govern Native American internal affairs.
Considerable debate exists over the consequences of Johnson
for Native Americans. On the one hand, it has been argued that in
the Fletcher-Johnson sequence, "Marshall lent faint color to
Jackson's aggression... [because]Indians could be deprived by a
legal fiction of their title by 'discovery'." 1 1 0 It has also been stated,
Id. at 588-590. J. Youngblood Henderson argues that Marshall was, in fact, only referring to the
conquest of European competitors. Henderson, Unravellingthe Riddle ofAboriginal Title, 5 AM. IND. L.
REV. 75, 92 (1977).
108. Berman, supra note 65, at 648. Professor Jean Zorn further suggests that because it was
believed that some Indian lands had been taken by conquest, Marshall did not want to imply by
omission that these takings were unlawful. Letter fromJean Zorn to.Jill Norgren (Aug. 13, 1987).
109. See The Monroe Doctrine, Dec. 2, 1823. This United States proclamation occurred after
months of discussion with England on the possibility ofjoint action concerning instability in the New
World following rapidly changing political events in France, Spain, and Portugal. The Doctrine,
issued only by the United States, asserted that the hemisphere was henceforth not to be newly
colonized by European powers, although existing colonies of the European powers would not suffer
intervention by the United States. Id. The proclamation provided that any violation of this principle
by European powers would be perceived as a danger to the peace and safety of the United States. Id.
110. Veeder, supra note 102, at 17.
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however, that the "consequences flowing to the status of Indian
lands from [the conquest] theory were nonexistent." 1 1 1 While it has
been written that the decision left tribes with a title of "mere
occupancy and use," others have urged that the opinion should not
be clouded by the conquest dicta, negating the relatively small
1 2
qualification of nonalienability. 1
Assessing these varied readings requires both presumption
and a review of the legal record. There could only be conjecture as
to the immediate consequences for tribes of the Fletcher-Johnson
sequence. No tribe was party to either case. While the decisions
guaranteed occupancy title, they assumed implicitly - if not also
explicitly that tribes would shortly permit the "legal
extinguishment" the Court demanded." 3 Johnson is unclear as to
whether the government of the United States could require that
Native American governments alienate their land. The two
opinions could be seen as encouraging Americans ready and willing
to engage tribal governments aggressively in pursuit of Indian
land.
It is also argued that Marshall had to deal with the apparent
inconsistency of treating for tribal land given the assertion of
intrinsic property rights on the part of the discoverer nation. Here
it is argued that the Court understood treaties to constitute "legal
extinguishment" representing the purchase of occupancy rights, or
the removal of a "kind of lien on the discovering nation's
sovereignty," not "basic proprietary and political rights in North
America, for these flowed from discovery and [symbolic]
possession. ''114
The Court's decision in Johnson has been called "confusing
and occasionally incoherent," its dicta "ponderous." 1 1 5 However,
it is necessary to consider the task before the Court: the creation
and justification of property rights not for a colonial possession, but
for a Republic several decades old. Unlike Victoria and Vattel, the
Court was not arguing for a sovereign separated from her land by
an ocean. Practical politics would not permit Marshall to declare
that the Republic give back tribal land or pay a fair purchase price.
11.Berman, supra note 65, at 649. Berman, however, appears to contradict himself by an
earlier statement: "[T]he reasoning of the case created a theory of conquest that stands as a centerpiece
for thejudicialdiminution of native rights." Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 647-49.
113. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 596 (1823). For a discussion of Fletcher, see supra notes 45-78 and accompanying text.
For a discussion ofJohnson, see supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
114. G. Lester, supra note 1, at 193, 199.
115. Berman, supra note 65, at 644, 647.
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Marshall's "brilliant compromise," granting simultaneous, but
incomplete interests to both the discoverer and the tribes,
established the moral and political principle that Native American
governments must be respected both as to residential rights and the
legal standard by which tribes might be separated from their land
legal extinguishment by the discoverer nation - Indian
consent. Because it denied full title to tribes, the decision may be
viewed as corrupt. However, in fact, because Indians were not
direct parties to this litigation, Johnson as well as Fletcher involved
tribal rights only in the abstract. Given the political constraints on
the Court and its ultimately unfounded optimism that the tribes
would eventually sell their land, Johnson may be contemplated as
the Court waiting for the future to happen - hoping to structure a
future of United States-Indian relations informed by just and legal
standards, but counting upon an ongoing tribal willingness to make
land cessions so that the use of deceit and raw power would not be
necessary.
V. A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: THE CHEROKEE CASES
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Whatever stance leaders in the United States maintained with
respect to Indian property rights and sovereignty - and there did
exist a considerable range in attitude - few believed that tribal
governments would ultimately resist offers of land purchase.
Regardless of their "momentary" difference, most whites were
guided by the belief that it was only a matter of years before all the
discussion would be but a moot issue and the Indians would be
gone from lands east of the Mississippi which then constituted the
border of the United States. 11 6 For this reason, in some negotiations
116. As a result of 150 years of land deals, by the beginning of the nineteenth century many of
the Indian nations had moved inland and were not "visible" to the new Americans. Discussions of a
new federal policy of removal of Indian nations to western lands also began in the early nineteenth
century. See Monroe, First Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1817, in 2 A Compilationof the Messages and Papers
of the Presidents 17 (J. Richardson ed. 1897); Adams, Fourth Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1828, id. at
415-16. The national government also specifically encouraged the belief that the Indian would soon
be gone from eastern lands by entering into agreements to remove tribes. In 1802, for example, the
United States and Georgia signed an agreement by which Georgia would cede land for the
incorporation of the states of Alabama and Mississippi in return for the promise that the United
States would, at her expense, extinguish existing Indian title to land within the boundaries of
Georgia as soon as it could be done on peaceful and reasonable terms. Georgia Cession, Apr. 26,

1802, in 1 AMERICAN

STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS

126 (1832). In 1830 Congress further committed

itself to a formal policy of removal passing the Indian Removal Act. See Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat.
411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. S 174 (1982)). The first treaty of removal followed
immediately. See Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, United States-Choctaw Nation, 7
Stat. 333 (1830).
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the national government committed itself to Indian policies with
tribes on the one hand and states on the other, which proved
contradictory, and ultimately, irreconcilable.
The case of the Cherokee Nation and the state of Georgia two sovereign populations that lived coterminously in the Southeast
exemplified this conflict. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, led by astute, often bilingual officials, the Cherokee built
a centralized tribal organization bent upon stability and peaceful
coexistence.
Christian missionaries
were welcomed,
the
agricultural life of whites was increasingly practiced, and land was
sold to European governments. By one of these land treaties, the
Treaty of Holston of 1791,11 7 the United States secured lands and
continuing legal and political jurisdiction to the Cherokee Nation in
return for certain land cessions. Following the Treaty of Holston,
the United States supported the future of the Cherokee Nation with
foreign aid, subsidizing the work of white Protestant missionaries
and teachers who contributed to the permanence of Cherokee
settlements.
In 1802, however, the United States also entered into an
agreement with the State of Georgia by which the federal
government promised that it would, at its own expense, extinguish
Indian title to land "within" the boundaries of the state "as soon as
it could be done peaceably and on reasonable terms.' '18 For more
than two decades, however, the national government failed to act
on the 1802 covenant, and further enraged Georgians by
completing Indian removal in other states.' 19 The contradictions of
the 1791 and 1802 policies remained until President Andrew
Jackson, early in his first term, announced support for a new
Indian removal bill. 120
Encouraged by Jackson's stance, the Georgia Legislature lost
no time in pressing the issue to a hoped-for conclusion. It passed a
series of draconian laws - completely violative of existing federal
treaties - annexing Cherokee land, annulling the constitution
(ironically, modeled after the United States Constitution) and laws
of the Cherokee Nation, and substituting the jurisdiction of the
state over all individuals living within the borders of the tribe.1 21
117. Treaty of Holston, July 2, 1791, United States- Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 39.
118. W. KENNEDY, 2 MEMOIRS OF THE. LIFE OF WILLIAM WIRT 279 (1849). Also by this
agreement Georgia ceded land for the incorporation of the states of Alabama and Mississippi. Id.
119. Id. at 281, 284.
120. See G. WOODWARo, THEoCHEROKEES 158 (1963).
121. H. MALONE, CHEROKEES OF THE.OLD SOUTH 172-73 (1956). Anxious to encourage tribal
citizens to move west, the legislature designated Native Americans unequal in legal status barring
their participation as "competent witnesses" in Georgia courts. Id. at 172.
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With these bold statutes Georgia served notice on Congress that she
intended an immediate resolution of the "Indian question" and
that her actions would not be bound by the doctrine of "expansion
with honor," that is, by law rather than force. 122
The congressional legislation supported by Jackson, "[a]n act
to provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any
of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the river
Mississippi," 123 required the federal government to arrange for the
removal of southeastern tribes, including the Cherokee, to the
western side of the Mississippi. 2 4 Removal policy had become
increasingly popular in the 1820s as an alternative to national
policies of either military action against, or assimilation of, the
Indian. As an idea, removal had originated with Thomas Jefferson
at the time of the Louisiana Purchase.1 25 The legal concept centered
upon an "exchange" of aboriginal land title in eastern lands for fee
simple title, guaranteed by treaty, in homelands to be west of the
Mississippi, land that was not ancestral land, and land that was,
critically, already occupied by western Indian nations. Guaranteed
only by treaty, such title could be abrogated by Congress.
President Jackson very quickly aided, if not endorsed,
Georgia's jurisdictional legislation by withdrawing the federal
troops sent previously to protect the Cherokee. 1 26 The President
further weakened tribal efforts to resist Georgia's aggressions and
to lobby against the Removal Bill, by withholding federal annuities
owed to the Cherokee under land cession treaties. In a telling
speech, Jackson spelled out the philosophy behind his support of
the Removal Act:
Philanthropy could not wish to see this continent restored
to the condition in which it was found by our forefathers.
What good man would prefer a country covered with
forests, and ranged by a few thousand savages to our
extensive republic, studded with cities, towns, and
prosperous farms; embellished with all the improvements
122. Id.
123. Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. S 174 (1982)).
124. Id.
125. F. PRUCHA, supra note 22, at 183-84. The acquisition of the vast Louisiana Purchase
created space, in the minds of whites, for the removal of Indian nations east of the Mississippi. Id.
Jefferson believed Indians would be genetically equal to whites but that they were what, today,
would be labelled culturally deprived. C. CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE. APOSTLE OF
AMERICANISM 425-27 (1962). He favored their assimilation into western culture: this would mean
their taking up farming which required less land than hunting and gathering. Id.
126. Troops were sent in June of 1830 following Georgia's proclamation that she owned all

Cherokee land including their gold mines. G.

FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE.EMIGRATION OF THE.

FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 229-30 (1972). The troops were withdrawn at the insistence of the state. Id.
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which art can devise, or industry execute... and filled with
127
all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion!
The Removal Bill provoked acrimonious debate that
polarized the United States. Supporters stated that the
unquestioned higher purposes of western civilization demanded
that whites have open access to all eastern lands. Congressmen in
favor of the removal proposal argued that the United States had
never recognized Indian nations as having any attributes of
sovereignty and, therefore, no inherent property rights. A halfcentury of formal diplomacy between the United States and Indian
nations was summarily dismissed as something meant only to
flatter "their vanity.. .by the acknowledgement of their name and
128
rank."'
Opponents of the legislation, however, felt that other
principles had consistently governed United States law with respect
to the Indian nations. They labelled removal plans as open and
rank assaults on Indian sovereignty. Prominent members of
Congress characterized the bill as designed to flout firm and
binding treaty obligations, including the Treaty of Holston with the
Cherokee. The speech of New York Whig Henry Storrs typified
this position:
The committee [on Indian Affairs] have suggested that
we should not give much weight to "the stately forms
which Indian treaties have assumed, nor to the terms
often employed in them," but that we should rather
consider them as "mere names" and "forms of
intercourse."
If treating these Indian nations as
proprietors of a qualified interest in the soil - as
competent to enter into treaties - to contract alliance to make war and peace - to stipulate on points involving
and often qualifying the sovereignty of both parties, and
possessed generally of political attributes unknown to
individuals, and altogether absurd in their application to
subjects, is nothing more than "mere names" and
"stately forms," then this long practice of the Crown,
Colonies, the States, and the Federal Government,
indeed, proves nothing. Words no longer mean what
129
words import, and things are not what they are.
127. 7 CONG. DEB. app. x (1830).
128. HousE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, H.R.
129. 6 CONG. DEB. 1007-08 (1830).

REP. No. 227, at 11 (1830).
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Storrs' speech suggested that the United States had been
complicit by characterizing that sovereignty for the Indians who
lacked an understanding of western international law. 130 The
congressman continued:
We have not only recognized them as possessed of
attributes of sovereignty, but, in some of these treaties,
we have defined what these attributes are. We have taken
their lands as cessions - terms totally senseless if they are
citizens or individuals. We have stipulated for the right of
passage through their country, and for the use of their
harbors, for the restoration of prisoners, for the surrender
of fugitives from justice, servants, and slaves. We have
limited our own criminal jurisdiction and our own
sovereignty, and have disenfranchised our citizens by
subjecting them to other punishments than our
own .... You cannot open a chapter of Vattel, or any
writer on the law of nations, which does not define your
duties and explain your obligations. No municipal code
reaches them. If these acts of the Federal Government do
not show them to be sovereign to some extent, you cannot
show that you have ever acknowledged any nation to be
SO.131

The anti-removal cause drew the support of other prominent
members
of Congress,
including
men like
Webster,
Freylinghausen, and Clay, who were political antagonists of
President Jackson and who supported national power over states'
rights. 132 These men publicly attacked Georgia's actions and
chastised Jackson for ignoring binding treaty obligations. But
opponents of the Removal Bill were outnumbered. In a close vote
the legislation passed. In the most explicit test of Indian sovereignty
before the political branches of the United States Government,
Georgia prevailed, Jackson prevailed, and manifest destiny,
130. Id. at 1008.
131. Id. at 1010.
132. See R. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE.JACKSONIAN ERA 40-41 (1974); Burke, The
Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, andMorality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 507-08 (1969). Most of the men
who opposed Jackson and the policy of removal were easterners. Henry Clay from Kentucky,
however, was a westerner and leader of the Adams-Clay political faction that opposed the
Democratic party led by Jackson and Calhoun. See S. MoRIsoN, supra note 5, at 421. Critically, the
removal debate began in the decade of the 1820s when the Jeffersonian Republican party was
breaking up and men likeJackson, Clay, Webster and others competed to establish the new political
parties, and vision, of the Union. See id. at 422-23. Removal policy became a pawn in a discourse
that is somewhat facilely cha/racterized as the nationalist Whigs against the states' rights Democrats.
See id. at 423-24.
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already announced in the Monroe Doctrine seven years before,
presented itself more clearly. Yet on the face of the law, formal
principles had not been altered. The Removal Act articulated a
voluntary process of removal to be agreed upon through a process of
law.' 3 3 Nevertheless, the tenor of pro-removal debate and the very
nature of the bill, assaulted the sanctity of tribal sovereignty and
aboriginal land title. As white population density increased and
tribal willingness to continue land cessions diminished, the
profound contradictions of the 1791 treaty and 1802 agreement
could no longer be absorbed passively. Through the Removal Act
the political branches acknowledged a new era in which the realities
of this new Indian intransigence, together with their "occupancy
and use" title, demanded an altered national policy. Removal was
that policy, one that on paper appeared accommodating to all
parties with its sanitary language of tribal choice and United States
financial aid. 3 4 History was to prove the removal policy something
quite the contrary.
With the passage of the Removal Act, the Cherokee's hopes
for institutional political support in the United States ended; the
political branches of both state and federal governments had united
against them. It was at this point that the Cherokee Nation
considered the possibility of litigation to untangle the increasingly
confused and ambiguous web of text developing in federal Indian
law.' 35 Their policy options were not extensive. Failure of political
attempts to protect their rights left only war or the courts.
Unwilling to resort to force, reinforced by what they perceived to be
the white man's respect for the law, and encouraged by antiJacksonian statesmen like Webster, they chose to put their case
before the courts of the United States.
133. Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, 411-12 (1830) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 5 174
(1982)). The legislation empowered the President to create suitable districts for:
the reception of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange the lands
where they now reside, and removal there... [to] forever secure and guaranty to them,
and their heirs or successors, the country so exchanged with them; and if they prefer it,
that the United States will cause a patent or grant to be made and executed to them for
the same.
Id. at 412. The Act also directed that "nothing in this act.. shall be construed as authorizing or
directing the violation of any existing treaty between the United States and any of the Indian tribes."

Id.
134. Id. at 411-12. The Removal Act prescribed that land west of the Mississippi River could be
designated "for the reception of such tribes or nations of Indians as may choose to exchange lands
where they now reside and remove there." Id. at 412. The Act provided that the President could
authorize aid and assistance to the Indians as was necessary to enable the Indians to remove to the
exchanged land, and as was necessary for their support and subsistence for the first year after
removal. Id. Five hundred thousand dollars was appropriated to carry out the provisions of the Act.

Id.
135. W. KENNEDY, supra note 118, at 289.
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On the advice of the anti-Jacksonians, the Cherokee
leadership hired William Wirt and John Sergeant to take their case
to the Supreme Court. 13 6 The choice of legal counsel underlined the
political significance of the case. Wirt, former attorney general in
the Monroe and Adams administrations, and John Sergeant,
former head of the Bank of the United States, were central figures
of the anti-Jackson establishment that had chosen to support the
Cherokee cause. 137 For them, Cherokee Nation litigation would
serve to buttress their opposition to Jackson's narrow and
restrictive view of the power of the national government. Although
the court was an important final forum for the Cherokee, some
have argued that their lawsuit was, in large measure, merely an
expedient means for the President's opponents to foil his policies
1 38
and prevent his reelection.
An opportunity to put the issues of tribal sovereignty and
property rights to the test presented itself when Georgia, acting
upon its new laws, arrested and convicted a Cherokee citizen,
George Tassels (Corn Tassel), on the charge of murder. Attorney
Wirt seized the opportunity to assert Indian immunity from state
laws. 1 39 The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
which directed Georgia to show cause why a writ of error should
not be issued against it. 140 The state deliberately ignored the high
court's order contending that "the interference by the chief justice
of the supreme court of the U. States, in the administration of the
criminal laws of this state... [was] a flagrant violation of her
rights.' ' 4 1 Corn Tassel was executed in this extraordinary
expression of Georgia's contentious assertion of jurisdiction over
citizens of the Cherokee Nation as well as its continued resistance to
federal judicial review of state criminal law.
Failing in its attempt to marshall the power of the United
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
R. SATZ, supra note 132, at 39.
See T. WILKINS, CHEROKEE TRAGEDY: THE. STORY OF THE. RIDGE FAMILY AND THE.
DECIMATION OF A PEOPLE 208 (1970). The Cherokee Nation and its lead attorney, William Wirt of
Baltimore, were looking for a case by which to test the rights of the Nation in the face of Georgia's
assertion ofjurisdiction over it. See id. Wirt picked the case of George Tassels, a Cherokee convicted
of murdering another Indian within the borders of the Cherokee Nation. Id. at 209. Georgia had
insisted upon bringing Tassels to trial in its courts where he was sentenced to hang. Id. Tassels sued
out a writ of error. Id. On December 12, 1830, the United States Supreme Court cited the State of
Georgia to appear and to show cause why the writ should not be issued. Id. Demonstrating her scorn
for what officials termed unacceptable federal interference, Georgia ignored the court's order in an
act of nullification, and expedited George Tassels' execution. Id. Anticipating this assertion of states'
rights, Wirt had other litigation waiting by which the Cherokee Nation might challenge state
violations of her sovereignty. See id.; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
140. T. WILKINS, supra note 139, at 209.
141. Id.
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States judiciary against Georgia in the Corn Tassel case, the
Cherokee determined to seek relief by filing a motion in the name
of the entire sovereign and independent Cherokee Nation.142 In
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,'143 the Cherokee brought suit as a foreign
nation under the United States Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, filing to obtain an injunction and further relief, against
Georgia, for property rights violations claimed under the treaties
and laws of the United States.

B.

144

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF GUARDIANSHIp
"DOMESTIC DEPENDENT NATIONS"

FOR

Even more explicitly than in the Corn Tassel case, the
Cherokee hoped that raising the sovereign nation claim in Cherokee
Nation would force the Court to clarify principles of federal law as
1 45
they applied to the political and legal status of Indian nations.
Raising these issues, as a direct party to the litigation, would
seemingly present the Court with a far broader and more
nettlesome question than either Fletcher or Johnson, which had only
required a discussion of land rights.146 In particular, this litigation
demanded that the Court speak to the recognition of tribal
dominion as described by the United States in treaties of its own
writing.147 Unlike either the Fletcher or Johnson case, in this litigation
the tribe was a direct party claiming legal injury, thus barring a
148
purely abstract judicial consideration of aboriginal rights.
Specifically, a Supreme Court decision accepting the Cherokee's
claim of sovereignty would prevent states from exercising
jurisdiction over Indian tribes. In addition, a favorable opinion
would strengthen the Cherokee's hand politically by bringing at
least one branch of the government of the United States to their
cause.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Cherokee
Nation, however, denied the centerpiece of the tribe's case - the
argument that the Cherokee Nation was, and should legally be
considered, a foreign nation. 49 Instead, the majority noted that the
142. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
143.30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
144. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
145. See id.

146. For a discussion of Fletcher and Johnson, see supra notes 45-78 and notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
147. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
148. Id. at 16. For a discussion ofFletcherandJohnson, see supra notes 45-78 and notes 86-115 and
accompanying text.
149. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19.
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relation of Indians to the United States was unique, "perhaps
unlike that of any other two people in existence." 15 0 The Court
stated that Indian nations were not states within the United States,
but neither did it "comprehend" them in the "general term
'foreign nations'." 15 1 Therefore, the Court concluded that tribes
like the Cherokee lacked standing to invoke the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court under article three of the United States
152
Constitution.
Although failure to hear the case on its merits denied the
Cherokee the immediate protection of the Court, Marshall's
opinion was not a complete defeat for aboriginal rights. In dicta,
the majority opinion very specifically acknowledged a national
character of Indian tribes, designating the Cherokee as a domestic
dependent nation although not a foreign nation. 15 3 The Court
noted that the relationship between the Cherokee and the United
States "resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian.' 1 54 The Court
also described the Cherokee Nation as "capable of managing its
own affairs and governing itself, ... a people capable of maintaining
the relations of peace and war, [and] of being responsible in their
political character for any violation of their engagements.... ",155
A sweeping interpretation of history, treaties, politics, and the
doctrine of discovery resulted in Marshall's characterization of
tribes as "domestic dependent nations."1 56 Marshall stated:
The Indian territory is admitted to compose a part
of the United States. In all our maps, geographical
treatises, histories, and laws, it is so considered. In all our
intercourse with foreign nations...they are considered
within the jurisdictional limits of the United
States .... They acknowledge themselves in their treaties to
be under the protection of the United States....
They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will.... 157
Characterizing tribes as dependent domestic nations
diminished the legal and political status of the tribes with respect to
150. Id. at 16.
151. Id. at 19.

152. Id. at 20; see US. CONST. art. III, 5 2 (describing the extent ofjudicial power).
153. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17-18.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 16.

156. Id. at 17.
157. Id.
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the United States. Marshall's opinion suggests, however, that the
Court understood "unique" relations largely in terms of foreign
affairs and did not support interference in matters of internal tribal
governance.58 That is, the United States as the discoverer nation
had a vested property interest in tribal land and was asserting a
protectorate status over tribal nations that was congruent generally
with international law and, specifically, with discovery doctrine
and the eight-year old Monroe Doctrine:
They look to our government for protection ....
They and
their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as
by ourselves, as being so completely under the
sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any
attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connexion with them, would be considered by all as an
59
invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility. 1
Thus, while the characterization of tribes like the Cherokee as
"domestic dependent nations" was problematic from the
aboriginal point of view, the opinion did articulate principles of law
that were not altogether destructive of tribal interests. 160 In
addition to asserting the national character of tribes, the Court's
language of "protection" and "guardian" made explicit that it
recognized federal and not state jurisdiction over Indian tribes. 16 1
Moreover, the Court affirmed the Indians' "unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,' ' 162 and
clarified the ambiguity of Johnson on the subject of Indian consent
by indicating that only voluntary cession would be honored in
63
law.1
In not considering the case on the merits, the Supreme Court
had in no way supported, or condoned Georgia's assertion of
jurisdiction over the Cherokee. While the majority opinion charted
a fairly noncontroversial course hoping, no doubt, to avoid
unnecessary confrontation with President Jackson and bumptious
pro-removal factions, Indian rights were not forsaken. If
Marshall's opinion reflected the cautious approach with the Chief
Justice writing that the restraint of the Georgia Legislature and of
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
occupied,

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id. Marshall stated that the Indians had an unquestionable right to the lands they
"until that right be extinguished by voluntary cession to our government...." Id.
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the State's exercise of physical force savored "too much of the
exercise of political power," '1 64 at the same time he was not too
intimidated to express the moral support of the Court: "If Courts
were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated
1 65
to excite them can scarcely be imagined."
The fine balancing of interests ir Cherokee Nation was dictated
not only by the politically explosive nature of the case given by the
passage of the Removal Act and Jackson's pro-removal stance, but
also contemporary attempts by the Jacksonians to repeal the
Court's appellate jurisdiction as described in section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, and to limit the term of office of federal
judges.t 66 Marshall could not make a decision on the merits of the
case without estimating the consequences for the Court. 167 In a
calculus of politics and law, the majority concurred in a decision
informed in some measure by the likelihood of further political
attack on the Court. 168 Yet, while the ChiefJustice asserted that the
Cherokee had asked too much of the Court in this case, his closing
text invited more circumscribed litigation selectively addressing the
property right issue - in Marshall's words "a proper case with
proper parties. "169
If the majority opinion in Cherokee Nation was influenced by the
political climate, the dissent signed by Justices Thompson and
Story apparently was not. 7 0° Considering the complaint on the
merits and drawing upon Justice Johnson's earlier dissent in
Fletcher, Justices Thompson and Story argued that the Cherokee
Nation constituted a foreign nation as understood by the works of
Vattel, had never lost that status through conquest and that it
could, therefore, bring an original suit in the Supreme Court.' 1
164. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
165. Id. at 15.
166. C. WARREN, THE.SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 726 (1926); see Cherokee
Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20; Removal Act, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. S 174 (1982)); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 5 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87 (describing the court's
appellate jurisdiction). Another expression of the movement to limit the power of national
institutions in general, and the independence and influence of the Supreme Court specifically, was
the effort made by some congressmen in 1831 to repeal 1 25 of theJudiciary Act of 1789. C. WARREN,
supra at 736; seeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87. The Whigs opposed this and
defeated the bill. C. WARREN, supra at 738, 741. States' rights advocates then tried to push a measure
to amend the Constitution so as to limit the term of federal judges. Id. at 743.
167. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 50 (Thompson,J., dissenting).
171. Id.at 52-64. Justice Thompson argued that the Indian tribes constituted nations by virtue
of the definition of "nation." Id. at 53. That is, nations consisted of people living together as a
society, and governing themselves as a sovereignty. Id. Moreover, Thompson noted that the United
States had always treated them as a sovereign and independent authority. Id. Land had been
piirchased by the government through treaties; yet, all remaining land not so ceded had remained in
the governance of the Indian nation. Id. Thompson also emphasized that the Indian nations had
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The dissent asserted that the Cherokee Nation properly claimed
protection from Georgia's statutes under its treaties with the
United States, statutes which if left untouched would "go the
length of abrogating all the laws of the Cherokees, abolishing their
government, and.entirely subverting their national character. "172
The dissent concluded that the laws of Georgia, in violation of
acknowledged treaties, were repugnant to the United States
1' 73
Constitution, and therefore, were "void and inoperative."
Therefore, Thompson and Story urged an injunctive writ be issued
1 74
against the state of Georgia.
C.

THE SECOND "CHEROKEE CASE"

Even as the Court considered Cherokee Nation, 7 5 Georgia
continued her assault upon Cherokee sovereignty. Concerned with
the pro-tribal support expressed by missionaries and other whites,
the Georgia Legislature enacted a new statute prohibiting the
passage of any white person onto Cherokee territory without the
permission of the state.1 76 Although most whites complied with the
law, a handful of missionaries, including Samuel Worcester, defied

1
Georgia and were arrested.

77

The case of northern missionary Samuel Worcester offered
tribal attorneys the opportunity to fashion a new challenge to
Georgia's extension of state sovereignty over the Cherokee
Nation.1 7T The core question in this case,

Worcester v. Georgia,' 79

continued to center upon the constitutionality of Georgia's actions
and the right of Indian tribes, as nations, to be protected by the
laws and treaties of the United States. 8 0 The legal posture of the
case, however, which came to the Court on a writ of error from
Georgia's superior court, had changed significantly because of the
legal and political character of the plaintiff.18 1 As a white citizen
and resident of Vermont, Worcester had standing to challenge the
never been "by conquest, reduced to the situation of subject to any conqueror." Id. at 54. As such,
Thompson reasoned that, "there is as full and complete recognition of their sovereignty." Id. at 55.
172. Id. at 75.
173. Id. at 77.
174. Id. at 78. Thompson stated, "The complaint is not of a mere private trespass, admitting of
compensation of damages; but of injuries which go to the total destruction of the whole right of the
complainants. The mischief threatened is great and irreparable." Id.
175. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
176. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 521-25 (1832).
177. G. FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL 234 (1972); see Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 538.
178. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 536.
179. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
180. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)515, 541 (1832); seeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 5
25, 1 Stat. 73.
181. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 536.
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legality of the state laws.18 2 Ending a brief review of the
jurisdictional issues, the Chief Justice wrote: "[I]t is... too clear for
controversy, that the act of congress, by which this court is
constituted, has given it the power, and... the duty, of exercising
jurisdiction in this case." ' 183 In Cherokee Nation Marshall had urged

tribal attorneys to bring a property rights case. 18 4 Apparently
anxious to address just this issue, the Court dismissed the personal
nature of the litigation, stating that Worcester had no less an
185
interest in Georgia's laws "than if they affected his property."
The Court held that Worcester was "apprehended, tried, and
condemned, under colour of a law which has been shown to be
repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United

States." '18 6 The Court did not confine itself to a narrow
examination of Georgia's statute. 187 Rather, the Court outlined the
clearest, and most pro-Indian, principles embodied in a majority
opinion of the time, considerably refining principles announced in
earlier Supreme Court opinions, now drawing upon the earlier
analysis ofJustices Johnson and Thompson. 188
Worcester has been called the Supreme Court's declaration of
"Indian independence." 18 9 Despite continued support for the preemptive rights of the discoverer, Worcester sharply defended the
unchanged nature of tribal hegemony and property rights. 190
Relying heavily upon interpretation of colonial charters, treaties
between England, the United States, and Native American
governments, and rethinking the fundamental premises of the
discovery-conquest doctrine, the Court now underscored the
sovereign national status of tribal governments as recognized in
United States law. 191
182. Id.
183. Id. at 541.
184. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831).
185. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562.
186. Id. The court concluded that the actions by the state of Georgia were violative of the
Constitution of the United States after it determined:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force,
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.
The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
Id. at 561.
187. See id. at 562.
188. See id.
189. G. Lester, supra note 1, at 200; seeWorcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
190. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560.
191. Id. at 548-63.
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The refinements of the opinion addressed the ambiguities and
illogic of earlier Court text on federal Indian law, specifically the
language of "guardianship" and "domestic dependent nation"
contained in Cherokee Nation, 192 and the assertion of conquest and
ambiguity about Indian consent found in Johnson.193 The possible
encouragement of its earlier conquest language upon political
events in Georgia appears to have been very much on the Court'-s
mind in the Worcester opinion. 194 In a long discussion of history and
treaties, Chief Justice Marshall veered away from the suggestion of
conquest so prominent in Johnson,195 writing that "It is difficult to
comprehend... that the discovery... should give the discoverer rights
in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of
its ancient possessors." 196 The opinion described as "extravagant
and absurd" the idea that European discovery and settlement
constituted conquest or yielded property title under the common
law of Europe. 19 7 Rather, the pre-existing rights of the ancient
possessors coupled with European law of discovery granted no
more to the settler than the exclusive right to purchase title should
tribal governments consent to sell. 19 8 Underscoring the importance
of Indian consent, Marshall described European colonial charters
as "grants assert[ing] a title against Europeans only... [that] were
considered as blank paper so far as the rights of the natives were
concerned."' 199 Warning land hungry Americans, a stern Court
admonished that "[t]he power of war is given only for defense, not
for conquest,' '200 and that extinguishment of property title
resulting from aggression would not be recognized. 20 1 Without
explicitly citingJohnson, the Court turned its back on that opinion's
2
tough assertion of European conquest of North American tribes . 02
In Worcester the Court that the year before had described tribes

192. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
193.Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-90 (1823).
194. See id.; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543.
195. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587-90. For a discussion ofJohnson, see supra notes 86-115

and accompanying text.
196. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543. Compare Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543 (Court
disaffirmed the discovery doctrine's independent conveyance of rights) with Johnson, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) at 574 (Court stated that discovery gave the discoverer the exclusive right to appropriate
lands that the Indians occupied, and that Indian rights in such lands were necessarily diminished by
the discovery doctrine).
197. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544-45.
198. Id. at 545.
199. Id. at 546.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 545-56.
202. See id.; Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). For a discussion of
Johnson, see supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
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as "domestic dependent nations" 20 3 also concluded: "The
Indian nations ha[ve] always been considered as distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil .... ,"204 Analyzing the
specific legal position of the Cherokee Nation, the Court stated that
relevant treaties, such as the Treaty of Holston and the Treaty of
Hopewell 205 recognized explicitly the national character of the
Cherokees as well as their right to self-government, guaranteed
their lands, and imposed on the federal government the duty of
206
protecting these rights.
Still, the guardianship language from Cherokee Nation
seemingly burdened Worcester's characterization of Native
American governments as fully sovereign and national in form.207
Drawing directly upon Vattel to provide the necessary correctives,
the Court now wrote:
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence - its
right to self-government, by associating with a stronger,
and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to
provide for its safety, may place itself under the
protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself
20 8
of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.
"Protection" stated the Chief Justice, "does not imply the
2 09
destruction of the protected.
Consistent with Johnson and Cherokee Nation, tribal
governments were not conceded in Worcester to be in complete
control of their foreign relations, in particular, the right to cede
210
tribal land to any sovereign other than the discovering nation.
The tribe is, thus, meaningfully described as a "nation like any
other nation" with the power of internal self-government, but
significantly delimited in certain external dealings so that the
21 1
discoverer nation may protect its pre-emptive rights.
203. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). For a discussion of Cherokee
Nation, see supra notes 142-74 and accompanying text.
204. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
205. Treaty of Holston, July 2, 1791, United States- Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 39; Treaty of
Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, United States-Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 18.
206. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 551-56.
207. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
208.31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
209. Id. at 552.
210. Id.; see Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17; Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543,574 (1823).
211. See generally Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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Thus refined, the guardian-ward principle is understood as
combining an obligation for Indian national welfare with the
property right of the discoverer. It is a principle describing the
conduct of United States foreign relations. Interpreting treaty text
acknowledging the United States to have "the sole and exclusive
right of regulating the trade with the Indians, and managing all their
affairs," the Court underscored its interpretation of the relationship
as spelled out in documents of foreign relations: "To construe the
expression...into a surrender of self-government, would be, we
think, a perversion of their necessary meaning, and a departure
from the construction which has been uniformly put on them ....
It
is... inconceivable that they could have supposed themselves, by a
phrase thus slipped into an article, on another and most interesting
subject [trade], to have divested themselves of the right of selfgovernment on subjects not connected with trade." 2'1 2 Drawing
upon the Northwest Ordinance and the commerce clause, Marshall
argued that the proper construction of these phrases expressed a
charge to the United States Government, not individual states, to
carry on trade and intercourse with tribal nations, and to do so
2 13
according to tribal consent.
Contemporary with the passage of the Removal Act and
Georgia's aggrandizing conduct, the Court's message was
unequivocal. In the face of considerable animus from its own
government, the majority reached out in a conciliatory manner to
Native American governments finding not only that a non-Indian,
Samuel Worcester, had been condemned under a law "shown to be
repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States," but also that tribal nations held significant national
political and property rights owed the highest respect by the
United States. 21 4 Although not direct parties in this round of
litigation, the Cherokee Nation had finally won their case.
Marshall, usually a pragmatic statesman and jurist, seemingly
abandoned a calculus of self-serving judicial politics, putting the
rights of tribal nations squarely on the line against the announced
positions of the political branches of the federal government and the
ardent advocates of states' rights. 215
212. Id. at 553-54.
213. Id. at 554, 557. In Worcester, the Chief Justice cautioned the reader that documents of
diplomacy between Native American governments and the United States, written in English, were
ultimately controlled by whites and, thus, subject to the mischief of translation and translators. Id. at
547, 554, 555, 559-60. Specifically, Marshall points out that "the words nation [and] treaty are
words of our language.. .having definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense." Id. at 559-60.
214. Id. at 562.
215. See id. The extent to which judicial power was put on the line is reflected in the famous,
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The limits of the law, however, are amply demonstrated by
Worcester.2 16 Victory for both the missionaries and the Indians
depended upon enforcement of the Supreme Court's decision.
Here they both lost - the Cherokee with devastating results.
Georgia refused to release the missionaries. 217 They languished in
prison for several months while negotiations to free them
proceeded. 218 Meanwhile, rapidly -changing political events
resulting from South Carolina's Nullification Ordinance altered
the political climate in the United States and any opportunity the
Cherokee Nation might have had to use the Worcester opinion to
invoke the protection of the United States government against
Georgia. 21 9 The danger of civil war over the nullification issue real or imagined - caused many of President Jackson's former
220
opponents to rally to his support.
At this point the Cherokee government had no influence over
the course of events affecting it. To the extent that political support
for the tribe's cause had been directly related to anti-Jackson
sentiment and rejection of his states' rights position, change in the
President's policies as a result of South Carolina's rebellious act
brought about a regrouping of the Indians' friends and allies.
Jackson's nationalistic proclamation against South Carolina's
nullification and the desire to protect the Constitution and the
Union required that the fight on behalf of the Cherokee cease and
that the Jackson Administration be supported. 221 As only indirect
parties to Worcester's case, the Cherokee were unable to pursue
further legal action on their own. Pawns in the political game of
men like Webster, Wirt and Sergeant, the tribe had no legal
recourse when the missionaries reluctantly accepted a pardon early
perhaps apocryphal, comment by President Jackson following the reading of the opinion: "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it!" C. WARREN, supra note 166, at 754. On the
other hand, it is possible to argue that the broad, forthright support of Indian sovereignty expressed
in Worcester was abstract, and occurred because white men's rights and liberties were directly at issue.
For a discussion of politics subsequent to the decision, see Norgren & Shattuck, Limits of LegalAction:
The Cherokee Cases, 2 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 20-23 (1978).
216. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
217. G. FOREMAN, supra note 177, at 235.

218. Id.
219. See South Carolina Nullification Ordinance (Nov. 23, 1832). South Carolina, on the sixth
of a state convention called to consider the question of what it deemed an unconstitutional federal
tariff, declared the tariff null and void in that state. D. HOUSTOrN, A CRITICAL STUDY OF
NULLIFICATION IN SOUTH CAROLINA 110 (1968). State officials began organizing an army to enforce

the order that tariffs not be collected within its borders and threatened secession if the federal
government attempted to use force. Id. at 113. Compromise was achieved in the spring of 1833: the
tariff was reduced while, at the same time, the President was authorized to use force to collect duties.
South Carolina then repealed its ordinance. Id.at 129-33.
220. D. HOUSTON, supra note 219, at 118-19, 129-33.

221. Burke, supra note 132, at 530-31.
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in 1833.222 From this point on, the removal of the Cherokee to the
western side of the Mississippi River was only a matter of time.
VI. THE EARLY TEST; MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY
APPLICATION
OF ORIGINAL PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
The removal of the Cherokee and other eastern tribes after the
Worcester decision demonstrated the limits of the judiciary's ability
to reconcile basic conflict. In the 1830s, the legal victories of
Worcester could not be translated by Native American governments
into political realities. Moreover, while subsequent courts found
continuing authority for Indian sovereignty and property rights in
the language and conclusions of Worcester,223 in the decades
immediately following, courts also tortured the meaning of the
Worcester decision, or ignored it, usually in favor of Johnson's less
supportive language. 2 24 Federal Indian policy changed and
vacillated constantly in these decades: Indian governments were
cajoled; they were urged, and made, to remove and remain isolated
on reservations; they faced military action and were believed to be
a vanishing race; and, beginning in the 1870s and 1880s, the
Native American became the object of land allotment legislation
designed to "americanize" the individual and draw him out of his
isolation, and to end tribal society and government. 225 Vacillating
with the nation but ultimately moving in the direction of this
assimilation policy, Supreme Court decisions in this. period
sometimes heeded the principles of Worcester's "declaration of
Indian independence" and sometimes yielded to a more expansive
view of the guardian-ward relationship, and a more restrictive
posture concerning Indian occupancy title, and tribal right to
govern. 226 A pattern was established in which Worcester increasingly
became a precedent followed in name rather than substance.
A.

EARLY AFFIRMATION OF INDIAN TITLE

The Court's 1835 decision in Mitchel v. United States, 227 held
222. G. WOODWARD, supra note 120, at 195.
223. See, e.g., Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835) (concluding that Indian
title was as sacred as that of the whites). For a discussion of Mitchel, see infra notes 227-34 and
accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (stating that the native
tribes had never been treated as independent nations nor regarded as owners of the territories they
occupied). For a discussion of Rogers, see infra
notes 236-47 and accompanying text.
225. See Welsh, The Needs of the Time, AMERICANIZINO THE. AMERICAN INDIANS 96, 96-99 (F.
Prucha ed. 1973).
226. See G. Lester, supra note 1, at 200.
227. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
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faith with Worcester even though, curiously, it failed to cite that
decision. 228 Writing for the Court, Justice Baldwin asserted that
Indian occupancy title was "as sacred as the fee simple of the
whites," '2 9 and, critically, that "Indian possession or occupation
was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life;
their hunting grounds were as much in their actual possession as
the cleared fields of the whites.... ,,230 Moreover, the specific nature
of the dispute in Mitchel permitted Justice Baldwin to clarify what
had been conceded only in dictum inJohnson v. M'Intosh, namely,
that Indian title included the power to transfer as well as to
occupy. 23 1 This conclusion, along with continuing support for the
requirement that tribal consent be obtained to extinguish title, and
the Court's explicit statement that culturally diverse lifestyles were
not a bar to possession, 232 suggests that the Court had not been
daunted by political events in Georgia subsequent to Worcester. At
the same time, however, the Court maintained its commitment to
discovery theory and the dual, or split, nature of Indian land
title. 233 If this Court was willing to support Worcester, it was not
inclined to expand upon it in ways that would undermine the
234
ultimate real estate interests of the United States.
B.

EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL POWER OVER TRIBES

Mitchel was immediately followed by several decisions
similarly affirming the rights of Indian title. 235 But the tone and
direction of Justice Taney's opinion in United States v. Rogers, 236 an
1846 criminal rights case, spoke of a new era of judicial
interpretation concerning the doctrine of discovery. 23 7 Describing
Native Americans as an "unfortunate race" who have "never been
acknowledged or treated as independent nations by the European
228. See Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); see also Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (concluding that Indian nations are independent
communities that have natural rights to possess the soil they occupy).
229. Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 746 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48

(1831)).
230. Id. In Mitchel, the petitioners asserted title to lands in Florida pursuant to grants from
various Indian tribes of the Creek confederacy, and which grants were confirmed by Spain prior to
the cession of Florida to the United States. Id. at 725. The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of
the Superior Court of Middle Florida, confirmed Mitchel's title. Id. at 761-63.
231. Cohen, supra note 57, at 50; seeMitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 758-59;Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
232. Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 746.
233. Id. at 745-46.
234. See id.
235. See, e.g.,
Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4, 14 (1840) (ultimate title in Indian land is
encumbered with the right of tribal occupancy); Clark v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 195, 201
(1839)(same).

236. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
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governments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they
respectively occupied," 238 the Court held that a white man,
although he has married into, and become an acknowledged citizen
of an Indian tribe, "is not an Indian" and may not "throw off all
responsibility to the laws of the United States." 2 39 According to the
Court, although the murder of one white adopted by the Cherokee
Nation by another white, similarly adopted, occurred within the
territory of the Cherokee Nation, the Cherokee did not have
jurisdiction over the crime because the Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1834 concerned with criminal acts in Indian territory only
extended the right of jurisdiction to tribes in cases of Indians born
Indians. 24 0 The Supreme Court rejected the view of some members
of the lower court and the accused, Rogers, that the Cherokee
Nation "as a separate and distinct government . . . possessing
political rights and powers [could] receive and adopt, as members
of their, state, the subjects . . . of the United States . . . and to
naturalize such subjects ... and make them exclusively ... citizens
of the said Indian tribe, with regard to civil and political rights and
obligations.'' 2 4 1 In the Court's view, a tribe could make a white
man a member of the tribe, but not a member of the Indian race,
and by its interpretation, the right described in the 1834 legislation
242
applied only to racially Indian members of a tribe.
237. See United.States v. Rogers, 45 U.S.(4 How.) 567, 571-72 (1846). In Rogers, William S.
Rogers, a white man, was charged with the murder of Jacob Nicholson, also a white man, which
murder was alleged to have occurred in territory occupied by Cherokee Indians. Id. at 571. Rogers
asserted that both he and Nicholson had, prior to Nicholson's death, become citizens of the Cherokee
Nation, and therefore, the United States court had no jurisdiction in the matter. Id.
238. Id. at 572.
239. Id. at 572-73; see Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 161, S 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733 (1834)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. S 1152 (1976)). The Act provides, in relevant part:
[SJo much of the laws of the United States as provides for the punishment of crimes
committed within any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, shall be in force in the Indian country: Provided, the same shall not extend to
crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Rogers court explicitly approved, for the first time, the racial
implications of the Act. See Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573. For a discussion of federal criminal
jursdiction in Indian territory, see V. DELORIA & C. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE
161-92 (1983) and Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical
Perspective, 17 ARtIz. L. REv. 951 (1975).

240. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572-73; see Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 161, § 25, 4
Stat. 729, 733 (1834) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 5 1152 (1976)). For the text of § 25 of the
Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, see supra note 239.
241. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 570.
242. Id. at 572-73; see Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 161, § 25 (1834) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976)). For the text of S 25 of the Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, see
supra note 239. The Court asserted the right to establish criminal jurisdiction within Indian nations:
fWie think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of dispute, that the Indian
tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United States are subject to their
authority, and where the country occupied by them is not within the limits of one of
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Reinterpreting the doctrine of discovery to considerably
broaden its scope, the Supreme Court now read into that
doctrine the right to interfere in internal tribal affairs and to govern
Indians.2 4 3 The Court's opinion further diminished the tribal
sovereignty acknowledged in the Cherokee cases by asserting for the
first time that the power of the United States over tribes "need not
be tied to treatymaking and execution, or regulation of commerce
between Indians and outsiders. "244
Rogers initiated an era of broad interpretation by federal courts
of congressional power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. 245
The 1834 statute challenged in the Rogers case was one of several
laws based upon the commerce clause which, however, had "little
or no relation to commerce, such as travel, crimes by whites against
Indians or Indians against whites." ' 24 6 In the decades following
Rogers, combining this constitutional authority, and sometimes that
derived from the property clause, 247 with a broad view of the
guardianship authority asserted in Cherokee Nation, the Court on the
one hand encouraged the political branches to uphold their
responsibilities in foreign relations with Indian tribes while at the
same time increasingly approved the active regulation of domestic
tribal concerns by the federal government. The result mid-century
was a legal muddle in which the Courts usually characterized tribes
as nations in name and function, did not overturn Worcester, but, in
fact, permitted the encroachment of the United States Government
into domestic tribal policy and individual Indian's rights.
C. POST-ROGERS LIQUOR CASES
This new posture was expressed in a variety of cases
involving the regulation of Native American access to liquor. In
United States v. Holliday, 24 8 the Supreme Court upheld the use of
the states, Congress may by law punish any offence committed there, no matter

whether the offender be a white man or an Indian.
Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 572. The Court further stated that while the treaty of the United States
with the Cherokees guaranteed that nation the right to make laws for its people, these laws "shall not
be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States [or] acts ofCongress...regulating trade and
intercourse with the Indians." Id. at 573.
243. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
244. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
195, 211 (1984). See Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573.
245. See Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 573. The Court invoked political question doctrine as a
barrier to judicial examination of the federal government's assertion of sovereignty over tribal
governments, stating that the sovereignty question is one "for the law-making and political
department of the government, and not for thejudicial." Id. at 572.
246. F. COHEN, supra note 18, at 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.

247. U.S. CONST. art. IV, 5 3, cl.2.
248. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865).
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sweeping congressional power to forbid the sale of liquor to an
"Indian under charge of an Indian agent" although the Indian was
living off the reservation, and in one of the states of the United
States. 24 9 In United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 250 the
Court concluded that the power to regulate commerce with Indian
tribes was "as broad and free from restrictions as that to regulate
commerce with foreign nations .... ,,251 The Court's decision in
Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, like Holliday, restricted the
jurisdiction of state governments over Indians, 252 but more
importantly restricted the right of Indians to be free from United
States' 'liquor regulations specific to Indians where they lived
beyond the borders of a reservation. 253 This authority to regulate
the Indians themselves, and not merely the land occupied by tribes,
eventually meant that federal liquor prohibitions were applied to
Indians even when they "had assumed the responsibilities of state
254
citizenship and... held'fee simple title to the land they occupied."
The meaning of wardship invoked in the 1830s Cherokee
cases - that of a more powerful nation protecting a weaker one
from foreign intrusions - shifted decisively in these 1860s and
1870s decisions toward the position announced by Congress in the
1830s. In a House report accompanying the Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1834,255 members of the Committee on Indian Affairs
argued that the liquor prohibition provisos were "to enable
administrative officials to prevent the manufacture of whiskey by
Indians, who believed that they had the right to do as they pleased
in their own country, and acknowledged no restraint beyond the
laws of their own tribe. ',256 In other litigation involving Native
Americans, the Court similarly upheld this expanded view of
wardship. In Smith v. Stevens, 257 for example, the justices argued
249. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 416 (1865). Holliday involved a challenge
to United States interpretation of commerce power, as applied in the Indian Trade & Intercourse
Act, that included the right to regulate the sale of liquor to individual Indians, off the reservatidn as

well as on it. See id.; Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 729, 732, 733 (1834).
250. 93 U.S. 188 (1876).
251. United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 194 (1876). In Forty-Three
Gallons of Whiskey, the United States sought a declaration of forfeiture for spirituous liquor introduced
into Chippewa Indian territory, in violation of § 20 of the Indian Trade & Intercourse Act of 1864.

Id. at 189; see Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 5 20, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834) (imposing
penalty for disposing of liquors to Indians).
252. Forty-ThreeGallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. at 195; Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 418.
253. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. at 195.
254. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL fNDIAN
LAW 183 (1979).
255. See Indian Trade & Intercourse Act, ch. 161, S 425 Stat. 729 (1834) (regulating trade with
Indian tribes).
256. F. COHEN, supra note 18, at 91 (citing H. R. REP. No. 474, 23rd Cong., 1st Sess.
103
(1834) (report from the Committee of Indian Affairs)).
257. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 321 (1870).
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that Congress was entitled to "safeguard [Indian reservees] against
their own improvidence," a power that included the imposition of a
restriction on the individual Indian's right of alienation. 258
D.

TAXATION, TREATIES, AND LAND'TITLE

In these same years the Supreme Court continued to
recognize the "national character" of tribes despite its earlier
language in Rogers.25 9 The Court also acknowledged the validity of
binding treaties with tribal nations and the obligations undertaken
by the federal government in those treaties. 260 In The Cherokee
Tobacco,26t however, the Supreme Court agreed that an act of

Congress might supercede a prior treaty with a tribe. 262 Invoking
judicial restraint, the Cherokee Tobacco majority determined that the
imposition of a federal tax on liquor and tobacco despite prior
treaty agreement prohibiting the levy of such taxes upon tribes was
acceptable. 263 The Court, ironically, reasoned: "The burden must
rest somewhere. Revenue is indispensable to meet the public
necessities. Is it unreasonable that this small portion of it shall rest
upon these Indians? ' 264 Certainly there is irony in the Court
approving the reasonableness of taxing a people described by them
as wards in a "state

of pupilage.

' ' 265

In their dissent, Justices

Bradley and Davis argued that Congress had not intended to tax in
the Indian Territory and that Congress considered Indian

258. Smith v. Stevens, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 321, 326 (1870). In Smith, the Court upheld an act of
Congress that provided that Kansas Indians holding reserve title land pursuant to an 1825 treaty
between the United States and the Kansas Indians could not sell such land independently, that is,
without the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 323; see Act approved May 26, 1860, ch.
61, 12 Stat. 21, 21-22; Treaty with the Kansas Indians, June 3, 1825, United States-Kansas Indians,
7 Stat. 244.
259. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1866) (determining that Indians
are under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and that the Indian property is
withdrawn from the operation of state laws); see United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572
(1846) (stating that Indians had never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations, nor
regarded as owners of territory they occupied). For a discussion of Rogers, see supra notes 236-47 and
accompanying text.
260. See, e.g., Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 757 (determining that Indians are protected by
the treaties and laws of Congress); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 371-72 (1856)
(same).
261. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870).
262. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870). In Cherokee Tobacco, the Court
addressed the issue of whether Congress had the intent and power, pursuant to the Internal
Revenue Act of 1868, to tax tobacco and tobacco products manufactured by citizens of the Cherokee
Nation and sold within its boundaries, in the face of an 1866 treaty between the United States and
the Cherokee Nation agreeing that such tobacco should be exempt from taxation, and whether,
therefore, the seizure of defendants' tobacco in lieu of payment of taxes was legal. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id.; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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populations "autonomies invested with the power to make and
execute all laws for their domestic government.' '266
Continuing the uncertain pattern, two years after this
repudiation of treaty rights and diminution of tribal sovereignty in
Cherokee Tobacco, the Court rejected, for the third time since
Worcester, the contention that land grants from the discoverer
superceded title based upon Indian treaty. 2 67 In Holden v. Joy,26 8 the
Court not merely upheld the sanctity of treaties after the earlier
aberration, Cherokee Tobacco, but cited the consent requirement
with approval. 269 One year after the Holden decision, however, the
Court imposed a narrow reading of the occupancy and use
principle, with significant effect for tribal property interests, in
270
United States v. Cook.

In Cook, 271 Chief Justice Chase wrote that although the right
of use and occupancy is unlimited, "[t]he land cannot be sold by
the Indians, and consequently the timber, until rightfully severed,
cannot be." 272 According to the Court, the cutting of timber had to
be related to the improvement of the land, and could not simply be
273
taken to make a sale.
The Cook decision contains two opposing principles. On the
one hand, the Court described Indian occupancy and use as of
unlimited duration. 274 On the other hand, Justice Chase analogized
Indian title in Cook to that of the tenant for life: "What a tenant for
life may do upon the lands of a remainder-man the Indians may do
266. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 622 (Brady & Davis, J.J., dissenting). In the same
period, the Court continued to reject the encroachment of state power upon Native American Tribes.
See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 756, 759-61 (1866) (rejecting, as prohibited by
treaty, efforts by the state of Kansas to tax tribes while at the same time that the federal taxing of
Indians was approved).
267. See Holden v..Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 252-53 (1872) (rejecting the contention that land
grants from the United States superceded title based upon Indian treaty); Chouteau v. Molony, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 203, 239 (1853) (same); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746-47
(1835) (same). In Chouteau, an ejectment action was brought by Chouteau, a Missouri citizen, to
recover a large tract of land including the city of Dubuque, title of which he claimed traced back to
grants from the Fox Indians. Chouteau, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 221. Molony claimed the land under a
patent from the United States. Id. For a discussion of Mitchel, see supra notes 227-34 and
accompanying text.
268. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872).
269. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 244 (1872). Holden involved a challenge to the
validity of a land grant pursuant to treaty tojoy, a Cherokee Indian. Id. at 221-22.
270. See United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 594 (1873). In Cook an action of replevin
by the United States against the non-Indian, Cook, to recover possession of logs sold to Cook by
reservation Indians was challenged on the grounds that tribal right to occupancy includes the right to
sell as well as to make incidental use of land's resources. Id. at 592.
271.86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1873).
272. United State v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873).
273. Id.
274. Id.; see Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 (1835) (stating that "Indians
were protected in the possession of the lands they occupied and were considered as owning them by
a perpetual right of possession.. from generation to generation, not as the right of individuals located
on particular spots"). For a discussion of Mitchel, see supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
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.upon their reservation, but no more." 2
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Thus, to improve
agriculture, the tribe might legally cut timber, but even dead wood
could not simply be sold as a purely entrepreneurial effort. 276 Cook
thus limited the ability of tribes to enter into, and compete in, the
277
capitalist economy of North America.

VII. CONCLUSION
In the renaissance of tribal rights litigation in the 1970s, the
principles of the 1832 Worcester opinion were cited as "direct
authority" to validate claims. 278 Inasmuch as the decision has
never been overturned, it contains legal principles of continuing
authority. Yet much has changed in United States-Native
American relations in these 150 years. Both the letter and the spirit
of the principles articulated in Worcester have been severely tested:
the opinion has been ignored in favor of the earlier Johnson
decision. 279 The premises of tribal sovereignty and property rights
contained in Worcester have been rewritten, yielding significantly
narrower and weaker tribal prerogatives.
The Marshall Court had a rich body of international law and
considerable political relations from which to build a doctrine of
federal Indian law. Initially, the Court addressed the question of
Indian title as it designed a law of real property for the Republic. It
granted no absolute title to tribal land, but rather various rights to
different parties. In order to clarify questions of foreign relations
with Native American governments and issues of federalism as
275. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 594.
276. See id. In 1889, Congress enacted legislation authorizing the sale of dead wood on Indian
reservations, by the members of the tribe, when approved by the President. Act approved Feb. 16,
1889, ch. 172, 25 Stat. 673 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 5 196 (1982)).
277. See Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 594. Cook left several questions unsettled including whether,
in recovering the timber or its money value, the United States was to hold such capital in trust for the
Indian tribe concerned, or whether it rightfully accrued to the general treasury of the United States.
F. COHEN, supra note 18, at 314. Only in 1911 did an opinion of the attorney general determine that
occupants of Executive Order reservations were entitled to the proceeds of timber sales. Id.; see29
Op. Att'y Gen. 239, 240, 244(1911).
278. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suguamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 207 (1978) (citing Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 555 (1832), for the principle that Indian nations are necessarily
dependent on the United States for protection from lawless and injurious- intrusions into their
territory).
279. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1955) (citing
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) for the principle that the United States by
discovery and conquest had sovereignty over and ownership of Indian lands). Not only the same
court, but the same justice, wrote the opinions in Worcester and Johnson yielding these original
principles of federal Indian law. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). It can be argued, therefore, that when the same issues of
Indian sovereignty or Indian title are addressed, the discussion in the last opinion, Worcester, should
be authoritative. This is specifically supported by the significant modifications ofJohnson in Cherokee
Nation and, in particular, Worcester. See Berman, supra note 65, at 643.
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they affected interactions with tribes, the Court also affirmed the
national character of Indian, governments.
Increasingly, however, the work of the Supreme Court
detoured this law from original intentions, especially as expressed
in Worcester. The political branches of the United States
Government vacillated in their federal Indian policy from the 1830s
through the 1870s; so did the Court. Without abandoning a
framework of law, the United States sought a social, political, and
economic order that would minimize the existence of the Native
American by isolation, extermination, or assimilation. In the legal
opinions of the Supreme Court in this period, one finds confusion among jurists clinging to the ideal of a nation of laws,
while trying to accommodate expansionist nationalist interests in
the context of these original principles of Indian law. As the Court
wavered in its commitment to original Indian doctrine, it became
facile to use Worcester as the proper legal vessel to be filled, however,
with reworked principles. In time, this evolutionary process made
possible a body of late nineteenth and early twentieth century law
that entirely recast the status of Native Americans and United
States power over them. In developing federal Indian case law
consonant with American political and economic goals, the
Supreme Court deferred to what it described as the plenary power
of Congress in Indian affairs and elevated, indeed, transformed,
guardianship into a fiduciary power of sweeping proportions sheltering certain Native American interests while broadly
280
asserting the prerogatives of an expansionist American state.
280. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). In Kagama, tribal
members challenged the constitutionality of extending United States jurisdiction to Indian nations in
the case of a major crime. Id. at 375-76. The Court upheld the law, determining that tribes are only
semi-independent and are not nations. The Court stated, "Indian tribes are wards of the nation.
They are communities dependent on the United States [for protection from their weakness]." Id. at
383-84 (emphasis in original).
The right of Indian nations to self government, including but not limited to criminal
jurisdiction, can be abrogated by a higher sovereignty. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 56768 (1903) (articulating the Supreme Court's acceptance of the diminution of tribal rights in the name
of guardianship: the plenary power of Congress is not subject to judicial review; Congress may
abrogate treaties with tribes as their guardian). Lone Wofinvolved a suit by Lone Wolf who sought to
enjoin implementation of United States legislation transferring title to 2.5 million acres of "excess"
Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache land to itself. Id. at 560, 564. Lone Wolf argued that- transfer could
only occur, under terms of an 1867 treaty, with the consent of three-fourths of adult males of the tribe
and that the failure to obtain this number violated the treaty's consent requirement and due process
of law. Id. at 563-64. Lone Wolfhas been called the Indians' Dred Scott. Sioux Nation v. United States,
601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (NicholsJ., concurring), aff'd, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). Seealso, e.g.,
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445, 478 (1899) (affording the Supreme Court the
opportunity to assert that the plenary power of Congress derived from the Indians' condition of
dependency in a case involving an application for, and review of, Cherokee citizenship as part of an
allotment proceeding by claimant whose parents were not Cherokee at the time of his birth);
McBratney v. United States, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1882) (upholding state jurisdiction over the murder
of a non-Indian by a non-Indian within an Indian nation contrary to the provisions of the General
Crimes Act, which did not grant the extension of such authority onto reservations by states).
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If principled law is the core of the rule of law, then the United
States must cast out misapplied and reworked law and acknowledge
the original principles of federal Indian law. There can be no relief
from the often antagonistic relations between Native American
governments and the United States over questions of land, mineral
and water rights, criminal jurisdiction, regulation of commerce,
child custody, and religious freedom, until contemporary courts
fully apply these original principles even as they may work against
the interests of the United States and non-Indian citizens.

